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2 HUGO JALES AND ZHENGFEI YU
1. INTRODUCTION
Labor markets in developing countries are usually characterized by a large number of
informal employment relationships (Ulyssea, 2018). Rationalizing why some workers
and firms choose informal employment and understanding how informality interacts
with labor market policies are the goals of this paper. This paper contributes to the
literature by proposing a theoretical model that answers both of these questions.
In our empirical exercise, we study the connection between minimum wages and
informality in Brazil, a developing country characterized by a large informal sector.
We use a framework, closely following Roy (1951) and Rosen (1986), to explain the
heterogeneity in the type the employment – formal versus informal – and wages.
Workers and firms bargain over the wage and the sector under which production will
take place. This process generates an equilibrium distribution of employment, sector
choices – formal and informal –, and wages that possesses the key features of both the
Roy model and the compensating differentials model. We also show that the relative
strengths of these two mechanisms are related to the bargaining power parameter: In
the limit case in which the worker has all the bargaining power, the model collapses
to the standard Roy model. On the opposite end of the spectrum, when the firm has
all the bargaining power, wages feature only compensating differentials.
We show that informal sector workers can be characterized according to their second-
best sector alternative (formality versus non-employment) and that, although these
informal workers all share the same sector choice, they differ substantially in the way
that they respond to labor market policies. As a result, the economy’s response to a
policy that increases the costs of informality will largely depend on the fraction of
workers that belong to each group. Similarly, we show that a similar taxonomy can be
constructed for formal workers: They can be characterized according to their second-
best alternative (informality versus non-employment). The economy’s response to
policies that increase the costs of operation in the formal sector (such as an increase
in taxes or the minimum wage) will largely depend on the type of jobs formal workers
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hold.
In our empirical exercise, we estimate the effects of the minimum wage using a nation-
wide representative dataset of the Brazilian population known as “PNAD” for the
years 2001-2005. We find that the minimum wage increases expected wages in the
formal sector. On the other hand, the policy decreases the size of the formal sector.
This reduction is induced by both the disemployment effects of the policy and the
reallocation of workers to the informal sector as a result of the minimum wage.
Our results are related to the vast literature concerning the economic effects of the
minimum wage (Card and Krueger (1994), Card (1992), Dube et. al. (2010), Lemos
(2009), Sorkin (2014), Meer and West (2015), Aaronson (2001), Aaronson et. al.
(2012), Brochu and Green (2012), MaCurdy(2015), Baker et. al. (1999), Flinn (2006),
Tonin (2011), Jales (2017), Cengiz et. al. (2017), Heckman and Sedlacek (1981),
Slichter (2015), Engbom and Moser (2017), Monras (2019), Saltiel and Urzua´ (2018),
and many others). Our results also relate to the literature concerning the phenomena
of informality in developing countries and its relation to productivity (Galiani and
Weinschelbaum (2012), Meghir, Narita, and Robin (2015), Rauch (1991), Matos and
Ogura (2009), Ulyssea (2010, 2018), and many others). Lastly, our empirical exercise
is closely related to the econometric literature that exploits bunching (Saez (2010),
Kleven (2016), Jales and Yu (2017)) and discontinuities (Hahn et al. (2002), Calonico
et al. (2014)) to identify the causal effects of policy interventions.
Our analysis has three main contributions: (i) We provide a novel taxonomy of formal
workers/firms that extends the taxonomy typically used in the development literature
for informal workers. We show that whether a formal worker will lose his job or
move to an informal contract as a result of any policy that increases the costs of
formality fundamentally depends on which class the worker/firm belongs according
to our proposed taxonomy, and that bounds for the proportion of workers that belong
to each of these types can be obtained using policy variation such as labor taxes or
4 HUGO JALES AND ZHENGFEI YU
the minimum wage.1(ii) We study the joint determination of employment, sector
assignment (formal versus informal), and wages under a bargaining framework. This
framework nest the standard Roy model in one extreme of the bargaining power
space as a special case. Our analysis generates useful insights for when we should
expect differences in wages of workers assigned to different sectors to identify sector
productivity differentials, compensating wage differentials, or some weighted average
of both. Our results can help to shed light on how to interpret the results of the
literature that has investigated the causal effects of informality on wages (see, for
example, Otero-Cortes, 2018). (iii) Lastly, we endow our theoretical framework with
statistical assumptions on the shocks of the model in a way to arrive at a tractable
likelihood function. We use this to study the effects of a particular policy that increases
the costs of operation in the formal sector: the minimum wage. We show that under
our statistical assumptions, the joint distribution of sector and wages that prevail
under a minimum wage policy will collapse to the distribution proposed by Jales
(2018). This result is, to the best of our knowledge, the first fully specified structural
model for the labor market that rationalizes the statistical assumptions used in this
reduced-form framework.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the model and its implications.
Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5
concludes.
2. A BARGAINING MODEL
2.1. Environment
Let worker’s utility be given by: U(l, s, w) = l ·(w−ε+ηs), where w denotes the wage,
s ∈ {0, 1} denotes the type of employment contract (one for the formal sector, zero
1Our model also includes a characterization of informal contracts. This characterization nests
two of the leading explanations for the nature of the formal sector proposed in the literature. This
characterization is similar (but less general than) the characterization proposed by Ulyssea (2018).
Ullyssea’s characterization nests all of the leading explanations for the nature of the formal sector
in the context of a dynamic model. Since our model is static, it cannot include De Sotto’s (1989)
explanation, which is related to (red tape) entry costs to the formal sector.
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otherwise), l denotes a binary indicator of whether the worker is employed, ε denotes
the worker’s outside option, and ηs denotes the amenity associated with employment
at sector s. Let firm’s profit be given by: Π(l, s, w) = l · (α−w− τs), where α denotes
the worker’s productivity, τ1 the tax (and other costs) associated with formal sector
employment, and τ0 the costs of hiding this activity in the informal sector.
Workers and firms are heterogeneous with respect to (α, ε, τ1, τ0, η1, η0). Assume that
the economy consists of a large number of i.i.d. draws of the vector (α, ε, τ1, τ0, η1, η0),
where, for each draw, workers and firms behave as described below. This is implicitly
the same as assuming that all labor markets are segmented (perhaps across narrowly
defined city-occupation-industry cells), as in Lavecchia (2017), Lee and Saez (2008),
and others. In practice, this essentially restricts the analysis to the short-run, so that
workers and firms are not able to move across different markets or locations to bid
for jobs or workers that operate in different markets.2
In a given sector-occupation-city cell, a (single) worker bargains with a firm. The
~worker’s problem is to choose l ∈ {0, 1}, that is, to choose whether to work or not,
for any offer of the pair (w, s). The solution to this problem is characterized by a
threshold associated with the worker’s participation constraint (U(w, s, l) ≥ 0):
~l = 1I{w − ε+ ηs > 0}.
 
Similarly, the firm’s problem is to choose l , that is, to employ the worker or not,
for any given a pair of (w, s).3 The solution to the firm’s problem is also a threshold
2This assumption rules out some mechanisms that are important in the analysis of the effects
of the minimum wage, such as labor-labor substitution – as in Cengiz et al. (2017) – and changes
in labor market tightness – as in Flinn (2006)–. We discuss later how the results of the empirical
exercise can be made robust to violations of this restriction.
3We focus on the decision of a single worker bargaining with a single firm. Thus, we think of
every firm having at most a one employee. There are important relationships between firm size
and informality, all of which we abstract in our discussion. An interesting framework that explicitly
accounts for firm size in the context of informality can be found in Galiani and Weinschelbaum
(2012).
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associated with the firm’s participation constraint (Π(w, s, l) ≥ 0):
 
l = 1I{α− w − τs > 0}.
In general, there are multiple pairs of (w, s) such that labor supply equals labor
 
~demand, l = l , that is, there are many values for (w, s) that induce both worker
and firm to agree on employment. To resolve this indeterminacy, assume that the
equilibrium pair (w∗, s∗) is decided according to the solution of a Nash bargaining
problem:
(1) (w∗, s∗) = arg max (Π(l, s, w))1/2(U(l, s, w))1/2,
(w,s)
where w∗ and s∗ are the equilibrium wage and sector that prevail in the unconstrained
case, that is, in the absence of any labor market institution such as the minimum wage.
In the absence of a minimum wage policy, the bargaining process between worker and
firm operates unconstrained. Thus, any wage that solves the maximization problem
above, no matter how small, is valid. The solution to problem (1) is characterized as
follows and is proved in Appendix A.
(2) s∗ = 1I{η1 − η ∗
1
0 > τ1 − τ0}, and w = (α + ε− τs∗ − ηs∗) .
2
The worker will be employed in the formal sector if and only if the net (aggre-
gate) benefit is larger in the formal sector compared to the informal sector.4 Also,
we have that l∗, the equilibrium employment, has the property that l∗ = 1 ⇐⇒
min{U(1, s∗, w∗),Π((1, s∗, w∗)} > 0 , that is, the participation constraints of both
worker and firm have to be met for employment to be equal to one. The equilibrium
wage will be such that the total surplus from the transaction is split between worker
and firm.
4Note that this solution has the intuitive property that an increase in tax rates (or a decrease in
the cost of informality) induces the marginal workers to move to the informal sector.
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Define w1 (w0) as the equilibrium wage a worker would get if he were employed in
the formal (informal) sector. From the solution to the Nash Bargaining problem, we
have:
1 1
(3) w1 = (α + ε− τ1 − η1) , and w0 = (α + ε− τ0 − η0) .
2 2
The decision of formal versus informal employment is endogenous. It is based on the
opportunity costs of each state. In equilibrium, a worker will be employed in the
formal sector if τ1 − η1 < τ0 − η0. If the inequality is reversed, the worker will be
employed in the informal sector. We can then re-write w∗ as w∗ = s∗w1 + (1− s∗)w0
as the equilibrium wage of a employed worker.
Figure 1 displays the choice of employment and sector for different workers. The
horizontal line characterizes the geometric locus of workers and firms at the margin of
indifference between employment and non-employment. The vertical line characterizes
the geometric locus of firms and workers that are indifferent between producing in
the formal or the informal sector. Workers in the upper right quadrant are employed
in the formal sector, workers in the upper left quadrant are employed in the informal
sector, and workers in the bottom half are non-employed.
In general, the informal sector will have both firms that could operate in the formal
sector and firms that could not, given the current level of taxes and benefits. That
is, the model encompasses two of the leading explanations for informality as special
cases.5 To characterize these different groups, consider the thought experiment of
increasing enforcement. This is the case when τ0 →∞. In this situation, the costs of
5Ulyssea (2018) obtains a similar result in the context of a dynamic model. Ulyssea’s result also
incorporates a third view that associates informality with red tape and entry costs to the formal
sector. We abstract from this issue since, in a static model, there is no distinction between the costs
of formality and the costs of entering the formal sector. Another important distinction is that we
only model informality of the employment relationship, not the firm’s decision to register and pay
profit taxes. In the terminology of Ulyssea, our model is about employment contract informality (the
intensive margin), whereas Ullysea’s model is about both the extensive margin of informality (the
firm’s registration choice) and also the intensive margin of informality (the nature of the employment
contracts). For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Ulyssea (2018).
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Figure 1: Employment and sector choice
Note: Surplus is defined as r∗ = r1s∗ + r0(1− s∗), where rs = α+ ηs − ε− τs.
ource Simulated data from the model using Gaussian draws. See text for more details.S
operating in the informal sector become prohibitively large. As a result, the reaction
of the firms will be to either move to the formal sector or to go out of business.
Whether one or the other option will be chosen depends on the surplus associated
with the choice of operating in the formal sector. Thus, the response of the firm to
an increase in enforcement will depend on the ranking of the surplus of being formal,
informal, or non-participating before the policy of enforcement is introduced.
Parasite: limτ0→∞(s
∗, l∗) = (1, 1) ⇐⇒ α− ε+ η0 − τ0 ≥ α− ε+ η1 − τ1 ≥ 0.
Survival: limτ0→∞ l
∗ = 0 ⇐⇒ α− ε+ η0 − τ0 ≥ 0 ≥ α− ε+ η1 − τ1.
These equations show that some firms will react to the policy of increased enforcement
by moving to the formal sector. The firms that would choose to do that are the ones in
which α− ε+ η0− τ0 ≥ α− ε+ η1− τ1 ≥ 0. That is, the surplus in the informal sector
(before enforcement is introduced) is higher than the surplus in the formal sector,
which is higher than non-participating. In the terminology of La Porta and Shleifer
(2008), these firms correspond to the “parasite” view of informal employment.6
6It is worthwhile to note that La Porta and Shleifer’s taxonomy is originally designed to char-
acterize informality of the firm – that is, the decision to register and pay taxes–, whereas we are
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On the other hand, there are firms that will react to the policy of increased enforce-
ment by going out of business. The firms that would choose to do that are the ones in
α− ε+ η0− τ0 ≥ 0 ≥ α− ε+ η1− τ1. For these firms, the surplus (before enforcement
is introduced) is larger than the surplus of non-participation, and the surplus of non-
participation is larger than the surplus in the formal sector. These firms will react to
increased enforcement by leaving the market. They, in the terminology of La Porta
and Shleifer (2008), correspond to the “survival” view of informal employment.7
This result shows that a policy that increases enforcement will, in general, induce
some workers to become formal. However, this will happen at a cost of inducing other
workers to become unemployed. The geometrical locus that separates the parasite
from the survival companies is given by the negative 45-degree line, the line that
bisects the second and fourth quadrant. Figure 2 displays this relationship.
The model also allows for a similar taxonomy of formal firm-worker pairs. These
firms can be divided according to their response to a change in the environment that
increases the costs of operating in the formal sector. We will denote the firm (and
worker pairs) that respond to an increase in τ1 (τ1 → ∞) by going out of business
as “formal contracts of the first kind”. For these firms, there is no surplus from
operating in the informal sector. As a result, their next best option is not to operate
at all. Alternatively, we will denote by “formal contracts of the second kind” the
formal worker and firm pairs that respond by moving to the informal sector (when
τ1 →∞). For these firms, the surplus of operating in the informal sector is positive.
They choose to operate in the formal sector because at the current value of τ1 the
surplus is larger when they are formal.8
borrowing their definition and applying it to characterize informality of employment contracts. There
are important distinctions between firm informality and employment informality and the interaction
between these two phenomena can be economically relevant as well (Ulyssea, 2018). For the purposes
of our model and empirical exercise, we will abstract completely from the process of firm informality
and only focus on informality of employment contracts. So, whenever we refer to a informal firm in
our discussion, we mean a firm-worker pair for which the employment contract is informal.
7For an example of an actual policy that closely mimics our thought exercise of complete enforce-
ment, see Guzman (2017).
8The model predicts that attempts to increase the number of formal sector jobs by increasing the
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Figure 2: The parasite and the survival view of Informality
Note: Surplus is defined as r∗ = r1s∗ + r0(1− s∗), where rs = α+ ηs − ε− τs.
Source Simulated data from the model using Gaussian draws. See text for more details.
This characterization is helpful when thinking about the effects of the minimum wage,
as the minimum wage policy introduces a constraint on firm-worker pairs operating
in the formal sector. Employment relationships of the second kind will never respond
to the policy by terminating the contract. The worker and firm only need to decide
between staying in the formal sector and paying the minimum wage or to operating
in the informal sector. On the other hand, workers and firms that belong to the other
class – that is, those of employment of the first kind – they will never operate in the
informal sector. Thus, their choice is limited to remaining in the formal sector and
paying the minimum wage or terminating the contract. As one can see, in an economy
characterized by the possibility of informality, the effects of the minimum wage will
largely depend on how many contracts in the formal sector are characterized by
parasite firms and how many are characterized by survival firms (and, naturally, how
costs of operating in the informal sector (such as strengthening enforcement) will invariably generate
some employment losses, whereas reducing the costs of operating in the formal sector (by decreasing
taxes) will move marginal workers from the informal to the formal sector and, in addition, create
new jobs (Ulyssea, 2010).
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Figure 3: The taxonomy of formal and informal employment
Note: Surplus is defined as r∗ = r1s∗ + r0(1− s∗), where rs = α+ ηs − ε− τs.
Source Simulated data from the model using Gaussian draws. See text for more details.
many workers are affected by the minimum wage). Figure 3 displays the geometric
locus that separates these types of firms.
Formal employment of the first kind:
limτ1→∞ l
∗ = 0 ⇐⇒ α− ε+ η1 − τ1 ≥ 0 ≥ α− ε+ η0 − τ0
Formal employment of the second kind:
lim ∗ ∗τ1→∞(l , s ) = (1, 0) ⇐⇒ α− ε+ η1 − τ1 ≥ α− ε+ η0 − τ0 ≥ 0
2.2. Relationship with Rosen and Roy models
The model combines two distinct explanations for differences in wages across sectors:
Compensating differentials and (Roy-model type of) self-selection. When η0 = η1, the
worker is always employed in the sector where the wage draw is larger. That is, s∗ =
1I{w1 > w0}, as in the standard Roy-model. When τ1 = τ0, workers sort themselves
based on their idiosyncratic valuation of amenities, that is, s∗ = 1I{η1 > η0}. Note
that a mechanism similar to compensating differentials is present since ∂w1 < 0,
∂η1
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so the worker’s equilibrium wage is decreasing in η1, the valuation of the amenities
associated with working in that sector.
This section further explores the relationship between the model and the canonical
models of Roy and Rosen. It is interesting to see how the equilibrium wage and
sectors respond to changes in the worker’s bargaining power. In the baseline setup,
for simplicity, we set the worker’s and firm’s bargaining power to 0.5. It is interesting,
however, to consider the results when the bargaining power approaches the limits of
one or zero.
Proposition 1 When the bargaining power of the worker is one, we have that:
(a) ws = α − τs. This, in turn, implies that w1 − w0 = τ0 − τ1. Furthermore,
we have that ∂ws = 1, ∂ws = −1, and ∂ws = 0. Furthermore, we have that
∂α ∂τs ∂ηs
w1 − w0 = Π(1, 1, w)−Π(1, 0, w), so differences in assigned wages across sectors are
productivity differentials.
(b) If, in addition, η1 = η0, then the joint distribution of (w1, w
∗
0, s ) is indistinguish-
able from the standard Roy model, in which s∗ = 1I{w1 > w0}.
(c) Instead, if τ ∗0 − τ1 is constant across workers and Cov(α, s ) = 0, we have that
E[w1|s∗ = 1] − E[w0|s∗ = 0] = E[w1 − w0] = τ0 − τ1 = Π(1, 1, w) − Π(1, 0, w). That
is, differences in expected wages identify productivity differentials.
Proposition 1 shows that in the particular case in which the workers have all the
bargaining power, then wages cease to reflect Rosen’s (1986) notion of compensating
differentials. In this case, a worker’s wage will have no relationship with the amenities
associated with the job because he can extract all of the surplus associated with better
amenities into higher utility levels. As a result, wages only reflect differences in the
technology of production across sectors. These factors remain relevant in determining
the worker’s wage because they affect the participation constraint of the firm, whereas
the amenities, which only show up on the worker’s utility, do not.
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The second part of Proposition 1 shows that if workers do not perceive differences
in amenities across sectors, then the bargaining model features a joint distribution
of sector and wages that is indistinguishable from the standard Roy model, in which
workers select the sector that provides them the highest wage (s∗ = 1I{w1 > w0}).9
Proposition 2 When the bargaining power of the worker is zero, we have that:
(a) ws = ε − ηs. This, in turn, implies that w1 − w0 = η0 − η1, ∂ws = 0, ∂ws = −1,∂α ∂ηs
∂ws = 0. Furthermore, w1−w0 = U(1, 1, w)−U(1, 0, w), so difference in the assigned∂τs
wages across sectors are compensating differentials.
(b) If, in addition, τ ∗1 = τ0, then the joint distribution of (w1, w0, s ) is indistinguish-
able from a modified Roy featuring only “seemingly irrational selection”, in which
s∗ = 1I{w1 < w0}.
(c) Instead, if η1 − η ∗0 is constant across workers and Cov(ε, s ) = 0, we have that
E[w1|s∗ = 1] − E[w0|s∗ = 0] = η1 − η0 = U(1, 1, w) − U(1, 0, w). That is, differences
in expected wages identify compensating differentials.
Proposition 2 shows that in the particular case in which the firms have all the bargain-
ing power, then wages cease to reflect differences in productivity across sectors. In this
case, a worker’s wage will have no relationship with the worker’s productivity α or the
sector-specific productivity shock τs. Just as in the previous case, the intuition for this
result is simple: When the worker has no bargaining power, then the firm manages to
capture any surplus that is associated with higher productivity (in the form of general
productivity α or sector-specific productivity τs). This is the case because when the
firm has all the bargaining power, then wages are only affected by the variables that
show up in the worker’s participation constraint, namely the disutility of work ε and
9It is interesting to note that in the original work by Roy (1951) the worker needs to decide
between fishing and hunting (and not between two activities in which there is another party, the
firm owner, that the worker needs to negotiate with). It is implicitly assumed in the model that no
one owns the lake or the forest. Thus, the original Roy model implicitly implies that the worker has
all the bargaining power since no one can claim a stake of the worker’s proceeds.
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the sector-specific amenities ηs. In this setting, wages only reflect the opportunity cost
of employment ε, and the differences in wages across sectors reflect only Rosen’s no-
tion of compensating differentials. Part (b) of Proposition 2 shows the curious result
that if firms do not perceive productivity differences assigning the worker to different
sectors (τ1 = τ0), then the bargaining model features a joint distribution of sector and
wages that looks quite peculiar. In this setting, workers are always employed in the
sector in which they earn the least. There is, however, an intuitive explanation for this
result: When the firm has all the bargaining power, and there are no differences in
the production technology across sectors, then the sector choice that maximizes the
surplus is the one in which workers are assigned to the sector that they like the most
(the one with the highest value for the amenities). Since workers value the amenities,
the corresponding wage that respects the worker’s participation constraint is smaller.
Thus, workers go to the sector that they like the most, and, because of that, they
end up in the sectors where they earn the least (s∗ = 1I{w1 < w0}). These results
show that, under the limit case of zero bargaining power for the worker, the rela-
tionship between wage differentials and the willingness to pay for amenities approach
the one implied by Rosen’s compensating differential model. On the other extreme,
the relationship between wage differential and amenities does not reflect differences
in willingness to pay for amenities. It instead reflects productivity differentials across
sectors. When the bargaining power is in an interior point of the [0,1] interval, then
wage differentials will partially reflect compensating differentials and partially reflect
differences in unobserved productivity (or self-selection, as in Roy(1951)).10,11
10When the bargaining power of the worker is υ and Cov(η1−η0, τ1−τ0) = 0, then V ar[w1−w0] =
υ2V ar(η1−η0)+(1−υ)2V ar[τ1−τ0]. Thus, the relevance of unobserved heterogeneity of productivity
across sectors as an explanation for the differences between potential wages w1 and w0 is dictated
by the variance of the differences in productivity, the variance of the differences in the valuation of
amenities, and the worker’s bargaining power. If V ar[τ1−τ0] ≈ V ar[η1−η0], then the fraction of the
variance of the causal effect of sector on wage (w1 − w0) explained by Roy’s mechanism is given by
υ2
2 − . That is, when the variance of taste differentials is similar to the variance of productivityυ +(1 υ)2
differentials, then the relative importance of Roy’s mechanism when compared to Rosen’s mechanism
is driven entirely by the bargaining power of workers and firms. For a paper that focuses on this
type of decomposition in a different context, see Taber and Vejlin (2016).
11It is also interesting to note that it is possible for wages to be decreasing in the valuation
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2.3. The Minimum Wage
Suppose a minimum wage policy is introduced in this economy. Assume that the policy
is only binding in the formal sector; that is, if a worker is employed in the formal
sector, his wage must be above the minimum wage, but if the worker is employed
in the informal sector his wage can be greater or smaller than the minimum wage.
Denote by (w̃, s̃) the pair of wage and sector that would prevail in this economy in
the presence of the minimum wage.
The minimum wage policy introduces a new constraint in the Nash bargaining prob-
lem: 1I{w < m}sl = 0, where m is the minimum wage level. This constraint simply
states that it cannot be the case that s = 1, l = 1, and 1I{w < m} = 1. The worker
must be either informal, or unemployed, or, if he is employed and formal, it has to
be the case that his wage is greater than or equal to the minimum wage. The in-
troduction of the minimum wage changes the equilibrium joint distribution of sector
and wages. This equilibrium can be characterized by solving the constrained Nash
bargaining problem.12
The new equilibrium has the property that if in the absence of the minimum wage,
the worker’s wage was larger than the minimum wage (w∗ > m), then the worker
earns exactly the same wage once the policy is introduced. This is straightforward to
see since if the constraint imposed by the minimum wage is not binding for (l∗, s∗, w∗)
– the triplet employment, sector, and wage that solves the unconstrained Nash Bar-
of the amenities of the job even in a setting in which cross-market arbitrages are ruled out. The
equilibrium notion in Rosen’s model is one in which wages are decreasing in the value of amenities
because workers can arbitrage (moving from the bad jobs to the good ones) and, as a result, the
equilibrium wages will reflect the differences in the valuation of the amenities associated with the
job (for the marginal worker). In this setting, workers cannot arbitrage across markets, but even
still, wages will reflect the valuation of the amenities. A worker’s wage would be decreasing in η even
if there were only one sector in this economy, so no arbitrage is ever feasible. This happens because
amenities imply a higher surplus for the match (profit plus utility levels). This extra surplus will
be bargained over between the parties, and, as long as the worker is not able to fully capture the
surplus, part of it will be transferred to the employer. This transfer takes the form of a decrease in
the wage.
12In Appendix B we discuss in greater detail the welfare implications of the minimum wage in
this model.
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gaining problem – then it must be the case that (l∗, s∗, w∗) also solves the constrained
optimization problem.
For the workers whose constraint 1I{w < m}sl = 0 is binding when evaluated at the
equilibrium wage, sector, and employment, the solution will be different than it would
be in the absence of the minimum wage. Define the Nash Product by B(l, s, w) =
(Π(l, s, w))1/2(U(l, s, w))1/2. The constrained solution to the Bargaining problem is
given by: w = m, s = 1, and l = 1 if max{B(1, 1,m), B(1, 0, w0), B(0, ·, ·)} =
B(1, 1,m). This means that the worker remains employed in the formal sector and
earns the minimum wage if the Nash product of this action is still positive (so it
dominates being fired) and also it is greater than the Nash product obtained when
employing him in the informal sector assigning him to the optimal informal sector
wage. For later use in our empirical exercise, we denote the proportion of low wage
(1)
formal workers that “bunch” at the minimum wage by πm . This is an object we hope
to estimate from the data.
Conversely, the worker will move to the informal sector if
max{B(1, 1,m), B(1, 0, w0), B(0, ·, ·)} = B(1, 0, w0), that is, if the costs of moving the
worker to the informal sector are smaller than keeping him in the formal sector and
changing his wage. In this case, we have that w̃ = w0; that is, the worker will earn
in the presence of the minimum wage the wager associated with his assignment to
the informal sector, w0. Lastly, if both B(1, 1,m) and B(1, 0, w0) are negative, then
˜the constrained solution to the bargaining problem will be to let l = 0, that is, the
worker becomes unemployed. This will be the case if the worker’s cost of informality
is high and Π(1, 1,m) is negative, that is the (net of taxes and opportunity costs)
productivity of the worker is below the minimum wage. We denote the fraction of
low-wage formal workers that move to the informal sector as a result of the policy
(1)
by πd . Lastly, we let the remaining fraction of low-wage formal workers that end up
(1)
losing their jobs as a result of the minimum wage policy by πu .
Figure 4 displays the responses of different formal sector workers for which the mini-
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mum wage constraint is binding. The southeastern corner consists of workers whose
Nash product in the informal sector is still positive and larger than the Nash product
evaluated at formal employment at the minimum wage. These workers move to the
informal sector as a response to the minimum wage policy. As shown in Figure 3,
all these workers are in formal employment contracts of the second kind. The north-
western corner consists of workers for which the Nash product when assigned to the
formal sector at the minimum wage B(1, 1,m) is positive and larger than the Nash
product when assigned to the informal sector B(1, 0, w0). These workers remain for-
mal and earn the minimum wage. These workers may belong to either formal-parasite
or formal-survival firms. The southwest corner consists of the workers for which both
the Nash product when assigned to the formal sector at the minimum wage B(1, 1,m)
and the Nash product when assigned to the informal sector B(1, 0, w0), are both neg-
ative. These workers lose their jobs once the minimum wage is introduced. All these
workers are, as shown in Figure 3, in formal employment contracts of the first kind.
The red lines characterize the geometric locus of the boundary of indifference between
these choices.
The difference in the surplus of workers and firms when operating in the formal and
informal sector is given by ∆ = 1(η1 − η0 − τ1 + τ0). The presence of Roy’s com-2
parative advantage (or unobserved heterogeneity) and Rosen’s compensating wage
differentials lead workers and firms to get distinct rents when they operate in differ-
ent sectors. That implies that workers that end up moving to the informal sector due
to the presence of the minimum wage could have utility levels that are, in principle,
quite different than the wages that they would have in the formal sector. Our next
result, however, shows that for small values of m, formal and informal sector surpluses
must be approximately the same for the workers that move. Consider the effect of
introducing a “small” minimum wage that approaches the lowest wage equilibrium in
the formal sector; that is, m is slightly above inf w1. For simplicity, assume inf w1 = 0.
Proposition 3 Let c denote some positive constant, we have:
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Figure 4: Formal workers’ response to the minimum wage
Employment and sector choice
Note: B(l, s, w) = Π(l, s, w)0.5U(l, s, w)0.5.
(a) For an arbitrary small c > 0, if the minimum wage m ≤ c2, then
Pr [∆ ≤ c|max{B(1, 1,m), B(1, 0, w0), B(0, ·, ·)} = B(1, 0, w0)] = 1.
(b) For all m, limc↓0 Pr [∆ ≤ c|max{B(1, 1,m), B(1, 0, w0), B(0, ·, ·)} = B(1, 1,m)] =
0.
(c) For all m, limc↓0 Pr [∆ ≤ c|max{B(1, 1,m), B(1, 0, w0), B(0, ·, ·)} = B(0, ·, ·)] =
0.
(d) For an arbitrary small c > 0, if the minimum wage m ≤ c, then
Pr [U(1, 1, w1) + Π(1, 1, w1) ≤ c|max{B(1, 1,m), B(1, 0, w0), B(0, ·, ·)} = B(0, ·, ·)] =
1.
Proposition 3 is proved in Appendix B, Section 2.2. Part (a) implies that the proba-
bility that the difference in workers’ utility between the formal and informal sectors
(i.e., ∆ = U(1, 1, w1)−U(1, 0, w0)) is close to zero, conditional on switching from the
formal to the informal sector as a result of a small minimum wage is 100%. In other
words, for small values of m and for the subset of workers that move to the informal
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sector due to the minimum wage, we have that U(1, 1, w1) is approximately the same
as U(1, 0, w0). As a result, the welfare cost of such a movement for these worker-firm
pairs is negligible. Parts (b) and (c) show that the same probability is zero for the
workers that bunch at m and also for those that lose their jobs. Part (d) shows that,
when m is small, if the result of the minimum wage policy is to induce a worker-firm
pair to dissolve the employment relationship, then the surplus of this employment
relationship must be small.13 The next proposition summarizes the expected welfare
change of formal workers due to the minimum wage.
Proposition 4 When the minimum wage is small, the change in formal worker’s
(1)
expected welfare is approximately given by m×πm times the fraction of formal workers
for which the policy is binding. This object can be bounded above by the minimum wage
level times the fraction of formal workers that are observed with wages equal to the
minimum wage. The upper bound coincides with the actual welfare approximation if
the minimum wage generates no unemployment.
Proposition 4 immediately follows from parts (a) and (d) of Proposition 3. Formal
workers who are affected by the minimum wage react in one of three ways: (i). shift
to informal sector; (ii) bunch at the minimum wage; and (iii) become unemployed.
Part (a) and (d) of Proposition 3 imply that at a small minimum wage, the expected
welfare change associate with reactions (i) and (iii) are close to zero. Therefore, the
expected welfare change comes solely from workers with reaction (ii), that is, those
who bunch at the minimum wage.
13Taken together, these results show that, if one only cares about the worker’s welfare and no value
is placed on the loss of labor tax revenues that comes out of the displacement of formal workers
to the informal sector due to the minimum wage policy, then the optimal minimum wage in this
economy is larger than zero. This is the case because both the rationing of jobs (unemployment
effects) and the reallocation of jobs (movements to the informal sector) that the policy induces are
both efficient in the sense of Lee and Saez (2012). Thus, the policy has a first-order welfare benefit
for the workers that bunch at m and second-order welfare costs for those that do not.
20 HUGO JALES AND ZHENGFEI YU
3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
One key challenge in bringing this model to the data is that we do not typically observe
certain objects, such as the value of time at home (ε), or the worker’s valuation of
formal job amenities (η1). In this section, we discuss the simplifying restrictions we
must impose on the model’s structure so we obtain a tractable likelihood function that
can be successfully computed when we only observe data on the pair of sector and
wage, but not on the fundamental shocks that drive the model (α, ε, τ1, η1, τ0, η0). We
show that, under certain restrictions, the model collapses to a two-sector structural
version of the model used by Meyer and Wise (1983) to evaluate the effects of the
minimum wage in the USA. We warn beforehand that although we believe that most
of these restrictions are justified, one fruitful avenue for future research would be to
attempt to estimate the model in a setting in which the econometrician observes a
richer set of drivers of the variation in wage and sector choice, which would render
disposable some of the restrictions we impose below.
Assumption 1 (Productivity distribution) The worker’s productivity α is drawn
from a log-normal distribution.
The assumption of log-normality is commonly invoked to model wage data (Meyer and
Wise (1983), Laroque and Salanié (2002), and many others). Roy (1950) developed
theoretical arguments that suggest that productivity should approximately follow a
log-normal distribution.
Assumption 2 Let us be the orthogonal projection of ε − ηs − τs on α and βs be
the corresponding projection coefficient. The variance of us is small in the following
sense: There exists two positive numbers t and k such that, Pr[| us | > t] ≤ k.
α(1+βs)
This assumption states that the distribution of wages is, up to some location and
scale shifts, approximates the distribution of worker’s productivity. A more detailed
description about the projection can be found in Appendix C, Section 3.1. Impor-
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tantly, this assumption does not impose that the remaining forces in the model, such
as the value of amenities, taxes, and time at home, are necessarily small. It allows
workers to be out of the labor force (ε→∞), it allows for some workers to arbitrarily
large costs of formality or informality. It also allows amenities (η) and costs (τ) to be
a non-trivial fraction of the worker’s productivity or wages. What the assumption re-
stricts is the probability that the component of these costs that varies independently
of the worker’s productivity becomes too large. Intuitively, what it states is that when
we look at workers at quantiles far apart on the wage distribution, we are inclined
to believe that there is a high likelihood that such large differences in earnings are
due to differences in the marginal product of labor. The most extreme opposite of
this assumption would be to believe that workers with large differences in earnings
must have similar productivities but large differences in the tax treatments of their
occupations (differences in τ) or large differences in the non-pecuniary aspects of the
job (η). We stress that we do not bound how large η, τ , or ε can be, so workers
with prohibitively large costs of formality or informality are not ruled out by this
assumption, neither are workers that are out of the labor force.14 In that sense, when
we look at the distribution of wages and observe workers with drastically different
wages, we do not assume that these differences should be immediately attributed to
large differences in the valuation of amenities, neither to differences in their costs of
operating in the formal/informal sector.15
Assumption 3 (Common-Support) In the absence of the minimum wage, the sup-
14For example, if the costs of formality for workers in a similar occupation are the sum of a constant
fraction of their productivity plus a firm-worker specific costs of bookkeeping, then Assumption 2
implies that the distribution of worker-firm specific costs of formality (the bookkeeping costs) are
small relative to the distribution of worker’s productivity.
15Together, Assumptions 1 and 2 stated above place strong restrictions in the shape of the joint
distribution of sector and wages, as we demonstrate in Proposition 5 below. As a result, these
assumptions are partially testable. In particular, if they are severely misspecified, the model fit
will likely be poor. Thus, an alternative way to judge the quality of these assumptions is to check
whether the joint distribution of sector and wages implied by these assumptions can reasonably fit
the observed data. We show in our empirical application that this is indeed the case for the Brazilian
labor market, although we cannot say that this must be the case in other settings.
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port of ws is R+ for both sectors.
This assumption states that, without the minimum wage, the effective lower bound
for both wage distributions is zero. This assumption is standard in the policy evalu-
ation literature. The key implication of this assumption is that, in the absence of the
minimum wage, the conditional probability of formality given the wage never touches
zero or one. If this assumption were violated, in the absence of the minimum wage, one
could predict with 100% accuracy the likelihood that a worker is formal or informal
just by knowing his latent wage, which would make the conditional probability model
degenerate. We believe that this is not a controversial assumption. In Appendix C,
Section 3.1, we show that, in the absence of such an assumption, we only need to add
one extra parameter to the model. The added parameter characterizes the lower end
of the support of the formal sector latent wage distribution.16
3.1. Implications
Under the assumptions 1, 2, and 3 presented in the previous section, we can character-
ize the joint distribution of sector and wage both in the absence and in the presence of
the minimum wage. In this section, we show this characterization and how it implies
a particular structure for the effects of the minimum wage, which can be thought of
as a two-sector extension of the empirical framework proposed by Meyer and Wise
(1983).
Given that our interest lies in estimating the causal effect of the minimum wage,
in the following discussion that follows it is useful to employ the Rubin potential
outcomes notation. In the presence of the minimum wage, a worker i is characterized
by a wage Wi(1) and a sector Si(1), which is equal to one if the worker is employed
in the formal sector and zero otherwise.
16We stress that in the presence of the minimum wage, the support of the wage distributions will
likely not be the same, since the formal sector wage distribution has a lower bound at m, whereas the
informal sector wage distribution has a lower bound at zero. Our assumption is about the support
of these wage distributions in the absence of a price floor.
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Also, let the pair (Wi(0), Si(0)) denote the counterfactual – or latent – wage and
sector that prevail in the absence of the minimum wage. Finally, define F0(w) (f0(w))
as the c.d.f (p.d.f) of latent wages W (0) and F (w) (f(w)) as the c.d.f (p.d.f) of
observed wages (Wi(1) or, using shorter notation, Wi). We assume that the econome-
trician observes a random sample of i.i.d. draws of the pair (W (1), S(1)), that is, the
econometrician only observes the data in the presence of the policy.
Proposition 5 (Latent wage distribution) Suppose Assumptions 1 to 3 hold. In
the absence of the minimum wage, the density of potential wages in the formal sector
fw1(x) and in the informal sector fw0(x) follow a log-normal distribution. In addition,
if (logws,∆)
′ approximately have a joint normal distribution, then the density of
log-wages for those that choose to work in each sector – that is, the formal sector
density flogw1 (x|S(0) = 1) and the informal sector density flogw0 (x|S(0) = 0) – follow
skew-normal distributions. The unconditional log-wage distribution flogw(x) follows a
mixture of skew-normals. In addition, if S(0) is independent of α, then this mixture
of skew-normals is well-approximated by a mixture of normals. Instead, if w1 ≈ w0,
then this mixture of skewed-normals collapse to a (single component) normal.
The exact form of wage distributions mentioned in Proposition 5 and its proof can be
found in Appendix C, Section 3.1. Proposition 5 specifies the shape of the distribution
of wages, both across sectors and also unconditionally, under different restrictions. Our
parametric family nest well-known parametric families used to model the distribution
of earnings. For example, when logw1 ≈ logw0 and also S(0) is independent of α,
then the distribution of wages collapses to the log-normal wage distribution that has
been used by Roy (1950). If we relax these two constraints, then the wage distribution
we obtain is identical to the canonical form of the Roy (1951) model of self-selection.
Finally, if we drop the common-support assumptions, the wage distribution becomes
a mixture of skewed and shifted log-normals. Defining θ0 to be the parameters of this
distribution and f0 to be the latent density of wages, we have that, f0(w) = f0(w; θ0).
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The advantage of using a parameterized functional form for the latent distribution
of wages is that it allows for maximum likelihood estimation of the model parame-
ters. On the other hand, the robustness of the empirical results to deviations from
log-normality is lost. Thus, there is a trade-off. In our empirical application, we show
that the Brazilian log-wage distribution seems to be well approximated by a normal
distribution, so even our most restrictive assumption provides an accurate approxima-
tion of the target distribution. The parametric assumption does not seem to impose
a significant loss of credibility in this particular exercise.
Proposition 6 (Conditional probability of the (latent) sector given the wage) The
conditional distribution of the latent sector, given the latent wage, belongs to the logit
parametric family {Λ(w, δ) : δ ∈ B ⊂ Rk}. That is, Pr[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w] =
Λ(w, δ0) for some δ0 ∈ B.
This result states that the conditional probability of formality given the wage, in the
absence of the minimum wage policy, can be approximated using a logit model, see
the Appendix C, Section 3.2 for details. In our empirical application, we find that
even a trivial model that forces the coefficient of the wage in the logistic regression
to be zero would give a reasonable fit to the data.
To complete the characterization of the joint distribution of latent and observed
wages, we need to characterize the form in which the minimum wage affects the joint
distribution of sector and wages, both above and below the minimum wage level. To do
that, we use the results from our theoretical model. For completeness, we summarize
the key model implications we use to derive the likelihood function in the following
remarks:
Remark 1 (Limited spillovers) Workers whose latent wages would be above k times
the minimum wage are not affected by the policy. That is, W (1) = W (0) and S(1) =
S(0) when W (0) > km, for a known k greater than or equal to one.
This remark only restates the fact that the constraint imposed by the minimum wage
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in this labor market is not binding for workers that earn more than m. Thus, as a
result, there will be no economic spillover effects of the minimum wage above km for
any k ≥ 1. However, this result still allows the upper part of the wage distribution to
be affected by the rescaling associated with the inflows and outflows of workers that
will occur as a result of the policy.
The structural model presented in Section 2.1 implies that one could choose k = 1,
since the model predicts that W (1) = W (0) whenever W (0) < m. However, this is a
simple consequence of the assumed absence of linkages between the labor market of
low-wage and high-wage workers in our model. In other words, the absence of spillovers
we obtain is close to an apriori assumption of the model. In many other models (see,
for example, Engbon and Moser, 2018), the minimum wage would induce spillover
effects higher up on the wage distribution. Moreover, there is evidence that these
effects are non-trivial (Engbon and Moser, 2018).17 Thus, we highlight here that we
only need spillovers to become small as we look further up on the wage distribution,
which is an assumption justified in most if not all models in which the minimum wage
generates spillover effects. In our baseline empirical results, we will assume away any
spillover, which is the same as setting k to be one. In Appendix D, we discuss how
one can estimate the model parameters allowing for some degree of spillovers higher
up on the wage distribution and discuss the results we obtain using this more robust
assumption.
Remark 2 (Minimum wage effects’ structure (strong characterization)) For wages
below the minimum wage (W (0) < m), we have the following: If S(0) = 0, then
(0)
S(1) = S(0). Additionally, with probability πd , – which is potentially a function of
the worker’s latent wage–, the wage (W (1) = W (0)) continues to be observed. With
(0) (0)
the complementary probability πm = 1 − πd , the worker earns the minimum wage
(W (1) = m).
17The economic mechanisms commonly invoked to explain how the minimum wage can affect work-
ers that would already earn more than the minimum wage are low-skill/high-skill labor substitution
(Teulings (2000)) and search externalities (Flinn (2006), Engbom and Moser (2017)).
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(1)
If S(0) = 1, then with probability πd , – which is also potentially a function of the
worker’s latent wage– the wage (W (1) ≈ W (0)ξ) continues to be observed, meaning
that the worker successfully transitions from the formal to the informal sector and thus
will earn his corresponding informal sector’s wage.18 In this case, the observed sector
(1)
will be S(1) = 0, which differs from the latent sector. With probability πm , the worker
earns the minimum wage (W (1) = m,S(1) = 1). With the complementary probability
(1) (1) (1)
(πu = 1− π −d πm ), the worker becomes unemployed (W (1) = ·, S(1) = ·).
Note that we allow here the possibility that informal workers will also “bunch” at
m when the minimum wage is introduced. We abstract from these considerations
in our theoretical exercise, but we accommodate for this regularity in our empirical
exercise.19
3.2. Estimation
Collecting the results of the previous section, we obtain a tractable expression for the
likelihood of the data under the minimum wage policy. Let Θ ≡ (θ, δ, π) be the entire
vector of model parameters, that is, those governing the latent distribution of wages,
the conditional probability of sector given wages and minimum wage effects. Define
the likelihood of observing a pair (w, s) given the minimum wage level m and model
parameters Θ as L(W (1) = w, S(1) = s|Θ) = Pr[S(1) = s|W (1) = w; Θ]f(w|Θ).
Given that log(L(W (1) = w, S(1) = s|Θ) = log Pr[S(1) = s|W (1) = w; Θ] +
log f(W (1) = w|Θ), we can define the maximum likelihood estimator of the model
parameters as Θ̂ = arg max 1
∑N
Θ i logL(wi, si|Θ).N
The numerical optimization of the likelihood function can be simplified using a three-
18The parameter ξ that appears on the expression W (1) ≈W (0)ξ measures the expected change
on a formal worker’s wage when he moves to the informal sector because of the minimum wage. ξ
corresponds to the ratio of the means of the latent distributions in the informal and formal sectors.
19These probabilities are reduced-form parameters that characterize how the minimum wage af-
fects wages and formality in the economy. These objects have, under the assumptions of the model,
internal validity to assess the effects of a particular minimum wage level and the effects of small
changes on it, but they are not invariant to changes in the economy, so they are subject to external
validity concerns and the Lucas’ critique.
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step procedure. First, estimate the parameters of the latent wage distribution by
considering only the values above the minimum wage:
θ̂ = arg max 1
∑N
θ i 1I{wi > m} log f(wi|wi > m; θ).N
The likelihood function in this first step closely resembles the likelihood from a Tobit
regression model (Tobin, 1958). To estimate the conditional probability of the latent
sector given the wages, one can run a logit regression using only wages above the
minimum wage: δ̂ = arg max 1
∑N
β 1I{wN i i > m} log Pr[si|wi; δ].
Finally, maximize the likelihood function over the subset of parameters that remains∑
to be estimated π using the full sample: π̂ = arg max 1 Nπ i logL(w θ̂i, si| , δ̂, π).N
This procedure yields consistent estimates because the density of wages for values
above the minimum is merely a function of a subset (θ) of the parameter vector (Θ)
and the fact that the true parameter θ0 that governs the shape of the density of latent
wages is the argument that maximizes E[log f(W (1)|W (1) > m; θ)].20 The same holds
for the conditional probability of sector given the wage: The conditional probability of
observed sector given the wage, for values above the minimum wage, is only a function
of δ and the true parameter δ0 that governs the relationship between latent sector
and wages is the argument that maximizes E[log(Pr[S(1)|W (1) > m; δ])]. In this
case, estimation is simple: In the first step, one merely needs to estimate a truncated
regression of wages on a constant for values above the minimum wage. Then, in the
second step, one needs to estimate a logit regression of sector on wages, using only
values above the minimum wage, as before. Only in the last step is the entire likelihood
function numerically optimized to recover π. Efficiency can then be improved by using
these estimates as initial values for the maximum likelihood estimator Θ.̂
In Appendix D, we discuss in detail how one can modify these estimators to obtain
robustness to minimum wage effects higher up on the wage distribution (spillovers)
and how to obtain robustness to misspecification of the minimum wage effects on the
20Strictly speaking, this holds whenever ξ is smaller than one, that is, on average, latent wages in
the formal sector are larger than on the informal sector. In the general case, one needs to condition
on wages larger than m× ξ.
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Table I: Descriptive Statistics
Parameter 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
E[W ] 5.92 5.98 6.08 6.15 6.25
Sd[W ] 0.73 0.73 0.71 0.70 0.67
Skewness[W] 0.37 0.31 0.22 0.19 0.19
Kurtosis[W] 4.28 4.52 4.66 4.76 4.75
Pr[W = m] 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.16
Pr[W < m] 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08
q80[W ] 6.41 6.54 6.58 6.68 6.68
q20[W ] 5.30 5.38 5.48 5.56 5.70
E[W |S = 1] 6.07 6.13 6.23 6.31 6.39
E[W |S = 0] 5.57 5.63 5.71 5.77 5.88
Sd[W |S = 1] 0.66 0.65 0.62 0.61 0.58
Sd[W |S = 0] 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.75 0.74
q80[W |S = 1] 6.55 6.62 6.68 6.75 6.80
q20[W |S = 1] 5.52 5.58 5.70 5.77 5.86
q80[W |S = 0] 6.11 6.21 6.21 6.25 6.40
q20[W |S = 0] 5.19 5.19 5.30 5.30 5.30
Pr[S = 1] 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.72
Pr[S = 1|W < m] 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.03
Pr[S = 1|W = m] 0.58 0.53 0.63 0.63 0.62
Pr[S = 1|W > m] 0.76 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.81
m 5.19 5.30 5.48 5.56 5.70
Note: Nominal wages in Brazilian R$.
bottom part of the wage distribution.
4. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION: THE EFFECTS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE IN BRAZIL
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
To evaluate the impact of the minimum wage in Brazil, we used the PNAD household
survey pooling years from 2001 to 2005. PNAD is an acronym for the Portuguese name
of the survey, which can be translated as “Nationwide Household Sample Survey”.
These data, which are representative of the Brazilian population, are collected yearly
by the IBGE, a Brazilian statistical agency. Workers who do not report wages, workers
who work in the public sector, and workers who are older than 60 years of age or
younger than 18 were removed from the sample. Additionally, workers who report
monthly wages above R$5000 were removed from the sample, which excludes the
upper 1.15% of the wage data.
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Figure 5: Wage distribution
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Note: Data from years 2001 to 2005. Log-wages normalized around the minimum wage level.
Figure 6: Empirical CDFs by Sector
Note: Year 2004.
30 HUGO JALES AND ZHENGFEI YU
Table I and Figures 5 and 6 present some empirical facts concerning the joint distri-
bution of sectors and wages for Brazilian data from the 2001–2005 period. Regarding
Table I, we observe that expected wages are higher during the later years, which are
characterized by higher minimum wage levels. Wages in the formal sector are, on
average, higher than wages in the informal sector. The informal sector comprises a
large share of the aggregate economy – approximately 28% based on these data. The
probability that a wage is equal to the minimum wage (Pr[W = m]) ranges from
8 to 14%. The proportion of workers who receive wages below the minimum wage
Pr[W < m] ranges from approximately 6 to 8%. The probability of working in the
formal sector as a function of the wage is discontinuous. It is approximately 79% for
values above the minimum wage, 59% at the minimum wage and virtually zero below
it.
4.2. Results
In this section, we report the results of our estimation of the effects of the minimum
wage. Our preferred specification uses lognormality for the latent wage distribution
and a linear in wage specification for the logistic regression of the conditional proba-
bility of formality given the wage. Further details about the estimation can be found
in the Appendix D.
Although our model estimates allow us to obtain estimates of the effects of the min-
imum wage on the wage distribution, our main interest lies in the effects of the
minimum wage on the size of the formal sector. The reasons for this are twofold:
First, the effects of the minimum wage on the wage distribution depend heavily on
our ability to correctly characterize the spillover effects of the policy, whereas the
effects of the minimum wage on the size of the formal sector do not. 21 Second, the
labor reallocation across sectors as a result of the policy is what allows us to obtain
21It can be shown that our estimates are invariant to misspecification of the effects of the minimum
wage on the upper part of the wage distribution or the shape of the latent wage distribution itself
whenever the conditional probability of latent sector given latent wage is flat. We find that in our
application, this assumption is close to being satisfied.
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information about the taxonomy of contract types we defined earlier in the paper.
For those reasons, we focus mainly on the effects on the size of the formal sector, and
we treat the other parameters such as the effects of the minimum wage on average
wages – although surely of interest on their own– as a nuisance for the purposes of
our exercise.
In examining the point estimates and standard errors in Table II, we observe sizable
estimates of the unemployment effects of the minimum wage. The results also indicate
that the minimum wage affects wages in both the formal and informal sectors. The
evidence from Table II suggests that sector mobility is limited. The estimates of the
(1)
sector-mobility parameter (πd ) are approximately 12%, averaging across different
years.
We estimate the latent size of the formal sector of approximately 78% of the economy
(taking the year 2004 as an example). This implies that the minimum wage reduces
the size of the formal sector by approximately 8%. The informal sector, on the other
hand, grows approximately by 27%, from about 22% to 28% of the economy. This
larger effect in the relative size of the informal sector is explained by the fact that
this sector is approximately 3.5 times smaller than the formal sector in the absence
of the policy. These values are similar to, although smaller than, the results obtained
by Jales (2018) using a closely related reduced-form framework.22 Again taking the
year 2004 as an example and using our welfare approximation formula, we find that
the minimum wage increases the ex-ante expected welfare of formal workers affected
22Jales’ (2018) model is more flexible in terms of the shape of the latent wage distribution, which is
there assumed only to be continuous but more restrictive in the shape of the conditional probability
of latent sector given the wage, which is assumed to be of order zero, or flat. This implies that, in
the absence of the minimum wage, the wage distribution of formal and informal sectors would be
indistinguishable from one another. This assumption is shown to be a useful approximation for the
case of the Brazilian labor market, but we believe that the approach we take here yields a better
approximation. In other words, the approximation error by assuming normality while being more
flexible in terms of the conditional probability of sector given the wage is likely to be smaller than
the error of assuming independence between latent sector and wages and continuous latent wage
distribution. The framework we use here is also able to accommodate both spillover effects and
richer structure for the effects of the minimum wage in the bottom part of the wage distribution.
The results we obtain allowing for spillovers are discussed in Appendix D.
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Table II: Parameter Estimates
Parameter 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Aggregate
πd Non-compliance 0.20
∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
πm Bunching 0.24
∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
πu Non-employment 0.56
∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Pr[W (0) < m] Fraction Affected 0.27∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Pr[S(0) = 1] Latent size of the formal sector 0.76∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Formal Sector
π
(1)
d Sector mobility 0.04
∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
π
(1)
m Bunching 0.19∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
π
(1)
u Non-employment 0.77∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Informal Sector
π
(0)
d Non-compliance 0.62
∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
π
(0)
m Bunching 0.38∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors (computed using 100 replications) are given in parentheses.
by the policy by around 52 Brazilian Reais. This is roughly 7% of the average wage
earned by formal sector workers in that year.23 Lastly, these estimates imply that –
for the subset of formal worker-firm pairs that the minimum wage is binding – the
fraction of contracts of the first kind must be between 71 and 91 percent, whereas the
fraction of contracts of the second kind must be between 4 and 23 percent.24
Figure 7 displays the observed and latent conditional probability of formality with
respect to wage. We can graphically observe the small elasticity of (latent) formality
with respect to the wage around the minimum wage level from the apparent horizon-
tal shape of this curve. This flatness contrasts with the steep slope of the observed
conditional probability of the sector given the wage, which discontinuously jumps at
23We stress that our welfare approximation is only valid for small enough minimum wage levels
and it does not include any spillover or general equilibrium effect of the policy, so this particular
estimate is subject to a much higher degree of uncertainty than the other estimates we report.
24These bounds come from the fact that the type of contract is identified provided that the worker
firm pair either moves to the informal sector or ends the employment relationship. For those that
bunch at the minimum wage, the minimum wage does not increase the costs of formality to an extent
large enough to identify the nature of the contract.
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Figure 7: Conditional Probability of the Sector Given the Wage
Note: Observed conditional probabilities based on a non-parametric local constant
(Nadaraya-Watson) estimator using a gaussian kernel (bandwidth = R$30). Year 2004.
the minimum wage level.
Figure 8 displays the observed and latent densities for the formal and informal sectors
based on the model parameter estimates for the year 2004. The latent wage distri-
bution tends to be below the observed distribution for the formal sector for values
above the minimum wage. This is a consequence of workers moving away from the for-
mal sector (into either unemployment or informal employment). The sector-mobility
channel increases the measured density above the minimum wage due to a rescal-
ing effect. The informal sector, as predicted by the model, behaves in the opposite
way: The observed density tends to be below the latent density for values above the
minimum wage. This result is due to the inflow of workers from the formal sector,
which induces a rescaling of the density and reduces its values above the minimum
wage. Figure 9 displays the fit of the model for the cumulative distribution functions
of the unconditional and conditional wage distributions. The model seems to be able
to capture the most important features of the joint distribution of sector and wage
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Figure 8: Latent and Observed Densities
Formal Sector Informal Sector
Note: Density estimates using a gaussian kernel (bandwidth = R$30). Year 2004.
Figure 9: Observed and Predicted CDFs
Aggregate Formal Informal
Note: Year 2004.
with a relatively small number of parameters. We discuss in greater detail the model
fit in Appendix D. In the appendix, we also discuss the robustness of these estimates
to the restrictions we impose on spillovers and also on the form through which the
minimum wage affects the bottom part of the wage distribution.
4.2.1. Marginal Effects of the Minimum Wage
In this section, we compute the effects of changes in the minimum wage level, using
a plug-in approach for the terms appearing the expressions for the marginal effects.
More details are discussed in Appendix E.
Table IV displays the estimated effects of changes in the minimum wage level implied
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Table IV: Marginal Effects
Parameter Expression 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Average Wage
Aggregate ∂E[W (1)]
∂m
8.40∗∗∗ 6.72∗∗∗ 8.41∗∗∗ 8.28∗∗∗ 7.18∗∗∗
(0.30) (0.29) (0.28) (0.23) (0.34)
Formal Sector ∂E[W (1)|S(1)=1]
∂m
16.16∗∗∗ 12.60∗∗∗ 16.54∗∗∗ 15.97∗∗∗ 13.23∗∗∗
(0.56) (0.55) (0.53) (0.45) (0.64)
Informal Sector ∂E[W (1)|S(1)=0]
∂m
1.61∗∗∗ 0.28 1.53∗∗∗ 1.44∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.20) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16)
Employment
Aggregate (% Change) ∂c
∂m
1
c
× 100 -1.96∗∗∗ -1.28∗∗∗ -1.71∗∗∗ -1.65∗∗∗ -1.13∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09)
Formal Sector (% Change) ∂c
(1)
∂m
1
c(1)
× 100 -3.62∗∗∗ -2.59∗∗∗ -3.37∗∗∗ -3.12∗∗∗ -2.38∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.14)
Informal Sector (% Change) ∂c
(0)
∂m
1
c(0)
× 100 0.31∗∗∗ 1.60∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08)
Relative size (% Change) ∂ log(Pr[S(1)=1]/Pr[S(1)=0])
∂m
× 100 -3.93∗∗∗ -4.18∗∗∗ -4.11∗∗∗ -3.81∗∗∗ -3.79∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Note: Marginal effect estimates multiplied by a typical change (R$20.00) in the minimum wage. Bootstrapped standard errors
(computed using 100 replications) are given in parentheses.
by the estimates of the structural parameters. We computed the effects of the mini-
mum wage on average wages, on employment, and on the relative size of the formal
sector. To place the numbers in perspective, we multiply the marginal effects obtained
by a typical change in the value of the minimum wage observed in the analyzed period
(R$20).25
The estimates show that the minimum wage increases wages for the aggregate econ-
omy. The estimated effect is approximately R$7.80, or 40% of the change in the
minimum wage. The estimated effects on average wages show a larger effect in the
formal sector, of approximately R$14.90. Both of these effects are driven by the in-
crease in the wage of low-wage workers and the decrease in the proportion of low-wage
workers.
The results indicate an effect close to zero for wages in the informal sector. The small
estimated effects of the minimum wage on average wages in the informal sector result
from a combination of higher wages for some informal workers and the inflow of low-
wage workers to the informal sector. This latter channel decreases the perceived effect
25Table IV reports the marginal effects of the minimum wage multiplied by a factor of 20. These
estimates provide an approximation of the effect of a discrete change in the minimum wage.
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of the policy in the informal sector.
Averaging the estimates across the period considered, the results suggest an approx-
imately 1.6% decrease in employment following a typical (and exogenous) change in
the minimum wage level. The decrease in the size of the formal sector is larger, approx-
imately 3%. The estimates show that the informal sector experiences a 0.95% increase
in employment. In terms of the relative size of the formal sector, the estimates suggest
a decrease of approximately 3.97%. To place this number in perspective, the size of
the formal sector in 2004 is 0.72. This estimate suggests that an exogenous increase
(of R$20,00) in the minimum wage level would induce the formal sector to decrease
to 0.71, that is, to decrease by one percentage point. This effect takes into account
the outflow of workers from the formal sector, the inflow of workers to the informal
sector, and the decrease in the size of the formal sector due to unemployment.26
4.3. Reduced-form evidence
Figure 10 displays levels of formality across states by year, as a function of a standard
measure of the strength of the minimum wage: the distance between the median wage
and the minimum wage level. If the minimum wage decreases the size of the formal
sector, one should expect, ceteris paribus, that comparable states with a larger fraction
of workers affected by the policy to present smaller levels of formality. One reasonable
concern, though, is that these states might not be comparable: States that are different
in terms of their wage distributions are also different in terms of their latent levels
of formality. We can, however, gather some evidence of these differences by looking
at points in the wage distribution in which we do not expect the minimum wage to
have any substantive effect on formality.
The graph on the left corner of Figure 10 displays the aggregate level of formality at
each state by year, as a function of the distance between the median wage and the
26This exercise highlights that the effect of marginal changes in the minimum wage may be too
small to be detected using time-series variation, especially if minimum wage changes are more likely
to happen during the boom part of business cycles. Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of all minimum
wage changes on the size of the formal sector may not be inconsequential.
LABOR MARKET POLICIES IN A ROY-ROSEN ECONOMY 37
Figure 10: Formality and wages across states by year
minimum wage. We see there a strong relationship: States for which the minimum
wage is more binding tend to present smaller levels of formality. This relationship may
or may not be related to the causal effect of the minimum wage since these differences
could be attributed to general differences in the level of formality across states that
happen to correlate with the minimum wage strength. The third graph, however,
suggests that this should not be a serious concern. Once one looks at the levels of
formality for wages above R$600, the relationship between the minimum wage and
the level of formality becomes weak. For wages above R$600,00, we do not expect
any difference to be attributed to minimum wage effects since this threshold rules out
workers that are directly affected by the policy. Thus, the relationship observed in the
right graph is a measure of how comparable the levels of formality are across different
states, at least for the workers with wages higher than R$600,00. The results suggest
that, although far from being a perfect control group, the bias associated with latent
differences in formality levels across states should be fairly small. This is certainly
true for the upper part of the wage distribution. If one believes that this is also true
for the bottom part of the wage distribution, then looking at the levels of formality
for low-wage groups could be informative about the effects of the minimum wage on
the size of the formal sector.
The center graph in Figure 10 displays the relationship between the minimum wage
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and the level of formality for the bottom part of the wage distribution. In contrast
with the graph on the right, there seems to be a strong relationship between how
close the minimum wage is to the median wage and how small the size of the formal
sector for low-wage workers is. This also shows that the differences between the levels
of formality across states are driven mainly by differences in the levels of formality
that prevail at the bottom of their wage distributions. The minimum wage stands out
as the most immediate explanation for this empirical regularity.
This evidence is in line with the main results of our empirical exercise: The minimum
wage seems to cause a decrease in the size of the formal sector. Once one compares
states by how strongly they were affected by the minimum wage policy, these states
tend to have a substantially smaller size of the formal sector for the bottom part of
the wage distribution, even though they seem to have somewhat comparable levels of
the size of the formal sector in the upper part of their wage distributions.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper uses a bargaining framework, in which workers and firms engage in a bar-
gain over the wage and the sector in which production will take place, to rationalize
the joint distribution of employment, sector, and wages. This framework is shown
to be useful to understand the effects of policies that increase the costs of operat-
ing in the informal sector (such as increased enforcement) and policies that impose
constraints on firms operating in the formal sector, such as the minimum wage. An
interesting feature of this bargaining framework is that differences in wages across
sectors will, in general, reflect both productivity differences – as in Roy (1951) – as
well as compensating differentials – as in Rosen (1986)–. In the limiting cases in which
either the work or the firm holds all the bargaining power, then wages start to reflect
only one of these distinct economic forces.
In our empirical exercise, we evaluate the effects of the minimum wage in the Brazil-
ian economy using a dual economy statistical model under a parametric assumption
regarding the shape of the latent wage distribution. The model seems to approximate
LABOR MARKET POLICIES IN A ROY-ROSEN ECONOMY 39
most of the stylized facts concerning the joint distribution of sectors and wages using
a small number of parameters.
We find that the minimum wage generates statistically significant non-employment
effects. The policy also leads a fraction – approximately 6% – of the affected workers
to move from the formal to the informal sector of the economy. This sector-mobility
channel, combined with the non-employment effects, leads to a decrease of approx-
imately 10% in the size of the formal sector when compared to the counterfactual
scenario of the absence of the minimum wage. Small sector-mobility probabilities in-
duce large changes in the relative size of the informal sector since the latent size of
the formal sector is approximately 3.5 times larger than the informal sector. Our es-
timates suggest that the informal sector experiences a growth of around 27%, from
22% to 28% of the economy, as a result of the minimum wage policy.
A decomposition exercise based on the estimates of the model parameters suggests
that unemployment effects and the inflow of low-wage workers to the informal sector
are responsible for most of the observed differences in the wage distribution across
sectors. Reduced-form evidence of such a sector mobility channel is in line with the
model’s prediction, that is, the differences in the size of the formal sector across states
for low- and high-wage groups replicate the patterns predicted by the model. These
results highlight the importance of accounting for the relationship between the level
of formality and labor market policies, such as the minimum wage, when analyzing
the effects of these policies in developing countries.
REFERENCES
Mariano Bosch, Edwin Goni, and William F Maloney. The determinants of rising informality in
Brazil: Evidence from gross worker flows. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series,
Vol, 2007.
Pierre Brochu and David A Green. The impact of minimum wages on labour market transitions.
The Economic Journal, 123(573):1203–1235, 2013.
Charles Brown. Equalizing differences in the labor market. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
94(1):113–134, 1980.
40 HUGO JALES AND ZHENGFEI YU
Sebastian Calonico, Matias D Cattaneo, and Rocio Titiunik. Robust nonparametric confidence
intervals for regression-discontinuity designs. Econometrica, 82(6):2295–2326, 2014.
Doruk Cengiz, Arindrajit Dube, Attila Lindner, and Ben Zipperer. The effect of minimum wages on
low-wage jobs. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 134(3):1405–1454, 2019.
Hernando De Soto. Theother path: The invisible revolution in the third world, 1989.
Joseph J Doyle Jr. Employment effects of a minimum wage: A density discontinuity design revisited.
Niklas Engbom and Christian Moser. Earnings inequality and the minimum wage: Evidence from
brazil. 2017.
Christopher J Flinn. Minimum wage effects on labor market outcomes under search, matching, and
endogenous contact rates. Econometrica, 74(4):1013–1062, 2006.
Miguel N Foguel and Carlos Henrique Corseuil. What drives the effect of labor inspections on formal
labor? the roles of information and punishment.
Sebastian Galiani and Federico Weinschelbaum. Modeling informality formally: households and
firms. Economic Inquiry, 50(3):821–838, 2012.
Wilson Guzman. The effects of increased enforcement of the national minimum wage law in a
developing country: The case of ecuador. 2017.
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In this section, we first prove that (s∗, w∗) characterized by (2) solves the Nash bar-
gaining problem (1) in the paper.
Recall that the worker’s utility is given by U(l, s, w, ) = l× (w− ε+ηs) and the firm’s
profit is given by Π(l, s, w) = l × (α− w − τs). The equilibrium employment, sector,
and wage is obtained by maximizing the Nash Product:
(A.1) (l∗, s∗, s∗) = arg maxU(l, s, w)νΠ(l, s, w)1−ν ,
where ν is the worker’s bargaining power and 1 − ν is the firm’s bargaining power.
A simple way to find the maximum of the Nash product in this case is to first set
s to one, and then maximize over w. Denote the Nash Product when evaluated at
l = 1, s = 1 – so the worker is employed and the constract is formal – at the wage w1
that maximizes the Nash product given l = 1 and s = 1 by B(1, 1, w1). Denote the
Nash Product when l = 1 and s = 0 – so the worker is employed and the contract
is informal – at the wage w0 that maximizes the Nash Product given l = 1 and
s = 0 by B(1, 0, w0), Lastly, compare the maximum obtained when s is set to one,
the maximum obtained when s = 0 – that is, compare the values of B(1, 1, w1) and
B(1, 0, w0). Given l and s, the ws that maximizes the Nash Product can be found by
taking the first order condition of B(l, s, w) with respect to w. This yields:
(A.2) w∗s = ν(α− τs) + (1− ν)(ε− ηs).
when ν = 1/2 this collapses to the wage equations we use in the simplified version of
the model presented on the paper, so that w1 =
1(α+ ε−η1− τ1) and w0 = 1(α+ ε−2 2
η0 − τ0). Evaluating Π(l = 1, s, w) and U(l = 1, s, w) at the optimal value of w = ws,
we obtain U(1, s, ws) = νrs and Π(1, s, ws) = (1−ν)rs, where rs = α−ε+ηs−τs is the
surplus of the match when the worker is assigned to sector s. Using these expressions,
we can obtain the value of the Nash Products when the worker is assigned to each
1. APPENDIX A: MODEL ANALYSIS
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sector: When s = 1, we have that B(1, 1, w1) = v
ν(1 − ν)1−νr1, and when s = 0, we
have that B(1, 0, w0) = v
ν(1 − ν)1−νr0. This implies that B(1, 1, w1) is greater than
B(1, 0, w0) only if r1 > r0. This yields the optimal sector assignment for all workers
that employed workers: s = 1I{r1 > r0}. Plugging in the definitions of the formal and
informal sectors’ match surpluses and removing the common terms, we obtain:
(A.3)
s∗ = 1I{r1 > r0} = 1I{α− ε+ η1 − τ1 > α− ε+ η0 − τ0} = 1I{η1 − η0 > τ1 − τ0},
which proves the solution (2) in the paper.
In the following, we prove Propositions 1 and 2. Recall that both propositions have
three parts. We focus on the proof of proposition 1 since the proof of proposition 2 is
analogous. We start with some definitions. The compensating wage differential is the
difference in the workers utility across two distinct sector allocations, when evaluated
at the same wage. It measures the worker’s willingness to pay for the job the (relative)
amenities of the job. In our setting, the compensating wage differentials is then defined
as U(1, 1, w)− U(1, 0, w). Evaluating this expression, we find that the compensating
wage differential is given by the difference in job amenities η1 − η0. Similarly, the
sector productivity differential is the difference between the firm’s profit when hiring
the worker in the formal sector when compared to hiring the worker in a informal
contract, when both of these options are evaluated at the same wage. It measures
the differences in the worker’s productivity (net of taxes, sector-specific costs and
distortions) when he is assigned to different types of employment. In our setting, the
sector productivity differential is defined as Π(1, 1, w) − Π(1, 0, w). Evaluating this
expression in the context of our model, we find that the sector productivity differential
is given by τ1 − τ0. Lastly, we say that a joint distribution of sector and wages is
consistent with the (standard) Roy model if the joint distribution of (w1, w0, s) is
such that s = 1 if, and only if, w1 > w0. That is, sector choice is based on income
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maximization, and income maximization alone.1
Proof of Proposition 1: Recall from the discussion of the previous section that, for
any bargaining power ν, the wage equation is given by ws = ν(α−τs)+(1−ν)(ε−ηs).
Taking ν = 1 yields the particular case in which the wage equation reduces to ws =
α − τs. This establishes the first claim of part (a) of proposition one. Taking partial
derivatives of w with respect to τ , α, and η , yields the second result: ∂wss s s = 1,∂α
∂ws = −1, and ∂ws = 0. This yields the second claim. Finally, taking the difference
∂τs ∂ηs
between w1 and w0 yields the conclusion that Π(1, 1, w)−Π(1, 0, w) is equal to w1−w0,
so the differences in wages across different sector assignments are the differences in
the worker’s productivity across sectors. This completes the proof of the last result
in part (a) of the proposition.
To prove part (b), recall that, for any bargaining power, we have that s =
1I{η1 − η0 > τ1 − τ0}. Then, if η1 = η0, then the sector choice equation collapses to
s = 1I{τ1 < τ0}, which in this case, using the simplified wage equation ws = α − τs,
leads us to conclude that s = 1I{w1 > w0}. This finally yields the conclusion that
when η1 = η0 and ν = 1, the joint distribution of (w1, w0, s) is indistinguishable from
the standard Roy model.
To prove part (c), we assume instead that τ1− τ0 is constant across workers and that
Cov(α, s∗) = 0. Then, E[w1|s = 1] − E[w0|s = 0] = E[α − τ1|s = 1] − E[α − τ0|s =
0] = τ1 − τ0 = Π(1, 1, w) − Π(1.0, w), where the first equality follows from the wage
equation, the second follows from the assumption on the covariance between α and s,
and the third follows from the assumption on the heterogeneity in τ across workers. In
this case, differences in wages across sectors identify sector productivity differentials.
Taking ν = 0 yields the particular case in which the wage equation reduces to ws =
ε−ηs. Taking the difference between w1 and w0 yields the conclusion that U(1, 1, w)−
U(1, 0, w) is equal to w1 − w0, so the differences in wages across different sector
1The Roy model is typically further parametrized so the joint distribution of (w1, w0) is assumed
to be bivariate normal, but this is not as important as the relationship between sector choice and
income maximization.
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assignments are compensating wage differentials. Now, if τ1 = τ0, then the sector
choice equation collapses to s = 1I{η1 > η0}, which in this case is identical to s =
1I{w1 < w0}, which yields the conclusion that when η1 = η0 and ν = 1, the joint
distribution of (w1, w0, s) is indistinguishable from a Roy model featuring seemingly
irrational selection, that is, s = 1I{w1 < w0}. Lastly, instead, assume that η1 − η0
is constant across workers and Cov(ε, s∗) = 0. Then, E[w1|s = 1] − E[w0|s = 0] =
E[ε − η1|s = 1] − E[ε − η0|s = 0] = τ1 − τ0 = U(1, 1, w) − U(1, 0, w), where the first
equality follows from the wage equation, the second follows from the assumption on
the covariance between ε and s∗ and the third follows from the assumption on the
heterogeneity in η across workers. In this case, differences in wages across sectors
identify compensating wage differentials.
2. APPENDIX B: WELFARE
2.1. Welfare Formulas
From the structure imposed by the model presented in Section 2, it is possible to
characterize the welfare effects of the minimum wage. Here we derive the expressions
for both worker’s welfare and also aggregate welfare,2 defined as the sum of workers’
utility and firm’s profits. Recall that w = 1(α + ε − η − τ ) let and ∆ = 1s s s (η1 −2 2
η0 − τ1 + τ0). Workers are employed formally whenever ∆ > 0. Define the aggregate
welfare:
(A.4) r∗s∗ ≡ Π(l∗, s∗, w∗) + U(l∗, s∗, w∗)
In the presence of the minimum wage, aggregate welfare will be given by the sum of
profits and utility that prevail at the equilibrium allocation under the effects of the
policy:
(A.5) r̃s̃ ≡ ˜ ˜Π(l, s,̃ w̃) + U(l, s,̃ w̃)
2Note that we do not include the tax revenues in the aggregate welfare definition.
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The difference between (A.5) and (A.4) corresponds to the welfare effect of the min-
imum wage. The expected value of that difference writes:
E ˜[r̃s̃ − r∗ ∗s∗ ] = −E[rs∗|w∗ < m, l = 0] Pr[w∗ < m, l∗ = 0]
−E [(η1 − τ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗1)− (η0 − τ0)|w < m, s > s̃] Pr[w < m, s > s̃].
Regarding the expression above, note that the welfare changes only for workers for
which the minimum wage “bites’ –that is – workers for which w∗ < m. Also, when the
worker-firm pair respond to the policy by setting the wage equal to m while keeping
the worker in the same sector, then the welfare effect of this response is zero. This is
so because, in this event, the minimum wage acts simply as a transfer of surplus from
the firm to the worker. However, if the response is to destroy the match, then the
welfare effect of the policy in this event is the negative of the surplus associated with
that match. Lastly, when the worker moves to the informal sector, then the welfare
effect of this change is given by minus (η1 − τ1) − (η0 − τ0). This term is negative
since the policy is inducing the worker to be assigned to a sub-optimal sector given
his draw of ηs and τs. It is, thus, straightforward to see that the aggregate welfare
effects of the minimum wage in this setting are negative.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the Bargain framework something that looks like
a version of “efficient rationing” in the sense of Lee and Saez (2012).3 It is possible
to characterize the reactions of worker-firm pairs according to a set of inequalities
associated with the difference between the worker’s productivity and his outside op-
tion. If the worker moves to the informal sector, we have the following inequalities
τ1 − η1 ≤ τ0 − η0 ≤ α − ε. This means that the surplus when formal is higher
than the surplus when informal. However, the surplus when informal is still positive.
If the worker-firm pair decides to end the match, we have the following inequalities
τ1−η1 ≤ α−ε ≤ τ0−η0. This means that the difference between the worker’s produc-
tivity and its outside option has to be bounded from above by the difference between
the costs of informality and the worker’s valuation of the amenities in the informal
3We thank Adam Lavecchia for pointing out this connection to us.
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sector. Furthermore, if a worker loses the job, it must be the case that α ≤ m + τ1.
These two inequalities limit the negative welfare effect of the minimum wage since the
unemployment falls on matches with productivity α bounded from above by m + τ1
and also by ε+ τ0− η0. We can obtain a similar expression for the welfare of workers:
E[U(l∗ ˜ ˜ ˜, s∗, w∗)− U(l, s,̃ w̃)] = −E[U(l∗, s∗, w∗)|l = 0, w∗ < m] Pr[l = 0, w∗ < m]
+E[m− w∗|w̃ = m] Pr[w̃ = m]
1
+ E[(η1 − τ1)− (η0 − τ0)|s̃ = 1, s∗ = 0] Pr[s̃ = 1, s∗ = 0].
2
This expression states that the expected change on worker’s welfare by the minimum
wage policy is given by an weighted average of the loss of utility associated with
the disemployment effect, the gain associated with the wage increases, and the losses
associated with inducing workers to move to the informal sector, where each of these
factors are weighted by the probability of these events. Differently than in the case
of aggregate welfare, the effects of the minimum wage on worker’s welfare are not
guaranteed to be negative. The welfare of workers can increase if the term associated
with the workers that bunch at the minimum wage is large enough.
2.2. The effect of a “small” minimum wage
Let rs =
1(α − τs − ε + ηs) for s = 1, 2. Note that r1 and r0 are the surplus for the2
worker and the firm in the formal and informal sector respectively. The Nash Product
in the formal sector with w = m is
B(1, 1,m) = [(m− ε+ η1)(α−m− τ1)]1/2[ ( ) ]1/22
1 1
= (α− τ η1)21 − ε+ − m− (α + ε− τ1 − η1)
4 2√
= r21 − (m− w1)2.
On the other hand, the Nash Product for the informal sector is B(1, 0, w0) = r0.
Recall that ∆ = (η1 − η0)− (τ1 − τ0) = r1 − r0.
Proof of Proposition 3: To simplify notations, we use “shift”, “bunch” and “un-
emp” to denote consequences of minimum wage: workers shifting from formal to
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informal sector, bunching at the minimum wage and becoming unemployment. Note
that these three events correspond to the conditioning events in the statement of
Proposition 3.
(a). Workers shifting from formal to informal sector due to the minimum wage are
characterized by ∆ ≥ 0, w 2 2 21 < m, r1 − (m− w1) < r0, and r0 > 0.
For arbitrary small value c > 0, if the minimum wage m ≤ c2, then
Pr [0 ≤ r 21 − r0 ≤ c, r21 − (m− w1) < r2 <Pr [∆ ≤ c|shift = 0, w1 m, r0 > 0]]
Pr [r1 − r0 ≥ 0, r21 − (m− w1)2 < r20, w1 < m, r0 > 0]
Pr [r 21 − r0 ≥ 0, r1 − (m− w1)2 < r20, w1 < m, r0 > 0]=
Pr [r1 − r0 ≥ 0, r21 − (m− w1)2 < r20, w1 < m, r0 > 0]
= 1,
where the second equality comes from that r21 − r20 < (m− w )2 ≤ c21 ⇒ r1 − r0 ≤ c.
(b). Workers bunching at the minimum wage m are characterized by ∆ ≥ 0, w1 < m,
r21 − (m− w1)2 ≥ r20 ≥ 0, and r0 ≥ 0. Then for all m, including small m, we have,
Pr [0 ≤ r − r ≤ c, r2 2 21 0
lim Pr [∆ ≤ c|bunch] = lim 1 − (m− w1) ≥ r0 > 0, w1 < m]
c↓0 ε↓0 Pr [r1 − r0 ≥ 0, r2 2 21 − (m− w1) ≥ r0 > 0, w1 < m]
= 0.
(c). Workers become unemployed if and only if r1 > 0, w1 < m, r1 < m − w1, and
r0 ≤ 0. Then for all m, including small m, we have
Pr [r1 − r0 ≤ c, r1 < m− w1, w1 < m, r1 > 0, r0 ≤ 0]
lim Pr [∆ ≤ c|unemp] = lim
c↓0 c↓0 Pr [r1 < m− w1, w1 < m, r1 > 0, r0 ≤ 0]
Pr [0 < r1 − r0 ≤ c, r1 < m− w1, w1 < m, r1 > 0, r0 ≤ 0]
= lim
c↓0 Pr [r1 < m− w1, w1 < m, r1 > 0, r0 ≤ 0]
= 0.
(d). For any small value of c, if m ≤ c, then r1 < m − w1 implies r1 ≤ c. Therefore,
for m ≤ c, we have
Pr [r1 ≤ c, r1 < m− w1, w1 < m, r1 > 0, r0 ≤ 0]
Pr [r1 ≤ c|unemp] =
Pr [r1 < m− w1, w1 < m, r1 > 0, r0 ≤ 0]
Pr [r1 < m− w1, w1 < m, r1 > 0, r0 ≤ 0]
=
Pr [r1 < m− w1, w1 < m, r1 > 0, r0 ≤ 0]
= 1.
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3. APPENDIX C: DISTRIBUTIONAL APPROXIMATIONS
In this section, we derive the results concerning the functional form for the joint
distribution of sector and wages that prevails in this economy both in the presence
and also in the absence of the minimum wage. These results allow us to arrive at a
tractable structure that can be used to estimate the model parameters. Here we prove
the results discussed in Section 3.1 of the paper.
3.1. Latent wage distributions
For s ∈ {0, 1}, consider ws = 1 (α + ε− ηs − τs). Decompose ε − ηs − τs into two2
parts: a part predicted by α and the remaining part.
ε− ηs − τs = β0s + β1sα + us,
where β0s and β1s are constants and E[αus] = E[us] = 0. Hence( )
1 1 us 1
ws = (α + β0s + β1sα + us) = α(1 + β1s) 1 + + β0s.
2 2 α(1 + β1s) 2
We restate Assumptions 1 to 3 in more specific forms as follows.
Assumption A1 logα has a normal distribution N(µ, σ2).
Assumption A2 There are small positive numbers t and κ such that[ ]
Pr | us | > t ≤ κ.
α(1+β1s)
Assumption A3 In the absence of the minimum wage, the support of ws is R+ for
s ∈ {1, 0}.
Proof of Proposition 5: Proposition 5 immediately follows from Proposition A1
below. Note that S(0) = 1I{∆ > 0}.
Proposition A1 (i). Under Assumptions A1 to A3, ws approximately has a
log-normal distribution. That is, logws has a normal distribution with mean µ −
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log ((1 + β1s)/2) and standard error σ.
(ii). Further assume that (logws,∆)′ approximatelyhave a joint normal distribution
σ2 ρsσσδ
with mean (µs, µ
′
δ) and covariance  . Then the conditional log wage
ρ σσ σ2s ∆ ∆
densities flogw1(x|∆ ≥ 0) and flogw0(x|∆ < 0) appr( oximately have− ) the following forms:( ) µ
x ∆
x
1 + ρ
µ− µ 1
( )
11 σ σ µ∆
(A.6) flogw1(x|∆ ≥ 0) ≈ φ Φ ∆√ /Φ ,σ σ 1− ρ2 σ( ∆1( ) )
x ∆
(
1 − µ −µ
)−0 ρ x−µ00σ σ µ∆
(A.7) flogw0(x|∆ < 0) ≈ φ Φ √∆ /Φ − .σ σ 1− ρ2 σ∆0
(iii). The density[ of the latent wage w is approximately( ) ( ) ( )]µ
1 x− µ ∆ + ρ x−µ1
( ) −µ∆ x−µ1 − 01 ρσ∆ x− µ0flogw(x) ≈ φ Φ √ σ σ+ φ Φ √ 0∆ σ .
σ σ 1− ρ2 σ1 1− ρ20
Proof: (i). ( ( ) )
us
Pr (ws ≤ x) = Pr logα + log ((1 + β1s)/2) + log 1 + ≤ log (x− β0s/2)
α(1 + β1s)
By Assumption A2,
( ( ) )
us
Pr log 1 + > log(1 + t) ≤ κ.
α(1 + β1s)
Since t is a small number, log(1 + t) ≈ t. Then there is a small number t′ > t such
that
( ( ) ) ( ( ) )
us ′ usPr log 1 + > t ≤ κ, and Pr log 1 + < −t′ ≤ κ.
α(1 + β1s) α(1 + β1s)
Applying Lemma A1 (to be stated below) with X = logα + log ((1 + β1s)/2) and( )
Y = log 1 + us , we have
α(1+β1s)
(A.8) Pr (ws ≤ x) ≈ Pr (logα + log ((1 + β1s)/2) ≤ log (x− β0s/2)) .
By Assumption A1, logα + log ((1 + β1s)/2) has a normal distribution with mean
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µ− log ((1 + β1s)/2) and standard error σ.
The support of ws is (β0s/2,+∞). By Assumption A3, β0s = 0. Therefore, logws has
a normal distribution with mean µ− log ((1 + β1s)/2) and standard error σ.
(ii). We focus on flogw1(x|∆ > 0). flogw0(x|∆ < 0) can be shown in the same way.∫ ∞
flogw1(x|∆ > 0) = flogw1,∆(x, δ)dδ/Pr(∆ > 0)
0 ∫ ∞
= flogw1(x) f∆| logw1(δ|x)dδ/Pr(∆ > 0)
0
(A.9) = flogw1(x) Pr(∆ > 0| logw1 = x)/Pr(∆ > 0)
By the joint normality assumption in (ii), ∆| logw1 = x approximately has the normal
distribution with mean µ∆ + ρ1σ∆/σ and variance (1− ρ21)σ2∆. Therefore,( )
µ∆ + ρ x−µ11σ
Pr(∆ > 0| w1 = x) = Φ ∆√ σlog .
1− ρ21
Meanwhile, by the log-normality of w1 and the normality of ∆, we have( ) ( )
1 x− µ1 µ∆
flogw1(x) = φ , Pr(∆ > 0) = Φσ σ σ∆
The desired result immediately follows. Note that the right hand side of (A.6) is a
little bit more general than the density function of skew-normal. It reduces to the
skew-normal if µ∆ = 0.
If ∆ is independent of α, then flogw1(x|∆ > 0) = flogw1(x), which has a normal
distribution by the result of part (i).
(iii). Observe that
flogw(x) = Pr (∆ ≥ 0) flogw(x|∆ ≥ 0) + Pr (∆ < 0) flogw(x|∆ < 0)
= Pr (∆ ≥ 0) flogw1(x|∆ ≥ 0) + Pr (∆ < 0) flogw0(x|∆ < 0),
where flogw1(x|∆ > 0) and flogw0(x|∆ < 0) are given in part (ii).( )
If w = x1 w0, then flogw(x) ≈ 1φ −µ , that is, w approximately has a log-normalσ σ
distribution.
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Q.E.D.
The following lemma is used in the proof of Proposition A1.
Lemma A1 Consider random variables X and Y . Assume that (i). X ∼ N(µ, σ);
(ii). there are small positive numbers t and κ such that Pr (|Y | > t) ≤ κ. Then(
Pr (X + Y ≤ z) ≈ Pr (X ≤ z) = Φ z−µ
)
.
σ
Proof: For any z ∈ R, observe that
Pr (X + Y ≤ z) ≤ Pr (X ≤ z + t) + Pr (Y ≤ −t)
Pr (X ≤ z − t) ≤ Pr (X + Y ≤ z) + Pr (−Y ≤ −t) ,
Combining the inequalities yields
Pr (X ≤ z − t)− κ ≤ Pr (X + Y ≤ z) ≤ Pr (X ≤ z + t) + κ.
Since X is normal and t, κ is small by assumption, Pr (X ≤ z − t), Pr (X ≤ z) and
Pr (X ≤ z + t) are close to one another. Hence, Pr (X + Y ≤ z) ≈ Pr (X ≤ z) .
Q.E.D.
3.2. Log odds ratio of conditional probability
In the setting( of Proposition A1, the)log odds ratio
Pr[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w]
log
1− Pr[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w]
= log fw1(w|∆ ≥ 0)− log fw0(w|∆ < 0) + log(p/(1− p))( ) ( ) ( )µ + loglogw − µ ∆1 logw − µ0 ρ w−µ1σ σ≈ log φ − log φ + log Φ ∆√
σ σ 1− ρ2( − )−µ∆ − ρ logw µ0
σ− log Φ ∆√ σ + log(p/(1− p))
1− ρ2( ) ( )
µ∆ + ρ logw−µ1 −µ∆ − ρ logw−µ0
σ σ σ σ µ1 − µ0 −µ2 + µ2
= log Φ ∆√ − log Φ ∆√ + logw + 1 0
1− ρ2 1− ρ2 σ2 2σ2
+ log(p/(1− p)).
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One can approximate Φ(x) by Polya’s formula Φ(x) ≈ 0.5 1 + 1− exp(−2x2/π) ,
which has a maximum error of 0.003 when x = 1.6. Overall the log adds ratio can be
approximated by a function of logw with unknown parameters.
3.3. In the presence of minimum wage
This section characterizes the distribution of wages in the presence of minimum wage.
The results here will be used in Appendix E. In the setting of Proposition A1, w0 ≈
w1ξ and r1 ≈ Kw1 + c for some positive constants ξ and K. For a worker previously
in the formal sector, i.e., S(0) = 1, his/her wage in the presence of the minimum wage
can be characterized by
(A.10) w1, if w ≥ m,m, if m−c ≤ w < m and ∆ ≥ b(w),
K+1
W (1) = ,w0, if m−c ≤ w < m and 0 ≤ ∆ < b(w), or w < m−c and 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ Kw + c, K+1 K+1· if w < m−c and ∆ > Kw + c. (unemployment)
K+1
√
where b(w) = Kw + c− (Kw + c)2 − (m− w)2. Let c(1) ≡ Pr [S(1) = 1], one has
∫ ∞ ∫ ∞ ∫ m ∫ ∞
c(1) = fw1,∆(w, δ)dδdw + fw1,∆(w, δ)dδdw.
m 0 m−c b(w)
K+1
For the workers in the formal sector, ( ) ( )µ logw
1I{w > m} logw − µ ∆1 + ρ
−µ1
1σ σ
fW (1)(w|S(1) = 1) = φ Φ ∆ √ ∆
c(1)σw σ 1− ρ2∫ ( ) 1
D(w −m) 1 logw − µ1
(A.11) + φ π(1)(w)dw,
c(1)σ w σ m
where [ (
b(w)−µ )]
c
∆ logw−µ
m− − ρ 11σ σ
π(1)m (w) = 1I{ ≤ w < m} 1− Φ ∆ √ ∆ .K + 1 1− ρ21
( √ )
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Therefore, the expected∫wage in the formal sector is∞
E [W (1)|S(1) = 1] = wfW (1)(w|S(1) = 1)dw
0 ∫
1 ∞
∫ ∞ ∫ m ∫ ∞
= w fw1,∆(w, δ)dδdw + fw1,∆(w, δ)dδdw.c(1) m 0 m−c b(w)
K+1
Now consider the informal sector. Let c(0) ≡ Pr [S(1) = 1].∫ ∫ (m−c)ξ
1 mξ b(w/ξ)
∫ ∫ +c
(0) 1
Kw/ξ
K+1
c = fw1,∆(w/ξ, δ)dδdw + fw1,∆(w/ξ, δ)dδdwξ (m−c)ξ 0 ξ max{0,−c/K} 0∫K+1
1 ∞
∫ min{0,Kw+c}
+ fw ,∆(w/ξ, δ)dδdw.
ξ 10 −∞
The observed wage density in the informal sector can(be written as
min{0,Kw+c}−µ )
f (w) f
∆ − logw−µ11w1 (1) w (w) ρσ σfW (1)(w|S(1) = 0) = πd (w) +
1 Φ ∆ √ ∆ ,
c(0)ξ c(0)ξ 1− ρ21
where [ (
b(w)−µ∆ − logw−
) ( )]
(m c)ξ ρ
µ1 −µ− ∆ −√ 1 ρ logw−µ11(1) σ σπ (w) = 1I{ ≤ w < mξ} Φ ∆ ∆ σ− Φ ∆ √ σ∆d K + 1 1− ρ21 1− ρ2[ ( ) (1 )]
Kw+c−µ logw−µ −µ logw−µ−cξ (m− c)ξ ∆ − ρ 1 ∆1 − ρ 11σ σ σ σ
+1I{max{0, } < w < } Φ ∆ √ ∆ − Φ ∆ √ ∆ .
K K + 1 1− ρ2 21 1− ρ1
As a result, the expected wage in the∫informal∫sector writes
1 mξ b(w/ξ)
E [W (1)|S(1) = 0] = w fw1,∆(w/ξ, δ)dδdwc(0)ξ (m−c)ξ 0∫K+1(m−c)ξ ∫
1 Kw/ξ+cK+1
+ w fw ,∆(w/ξ, δ)dδdw
c(0)ξ 1∫max{0,−c/K} 0
1 ∞
∫ min{0,Kw+c}
+ w fw
c(0)ξ 1
,∆(w/ξ, δ)dδdw.
0 −∞
The density of the observed wage is
c(1)fW (1)(w|S(1) = 1) + c(0)fW (1)(w|S(1) = 0)
fW (1)(w) = ,
c(1) + c(0)
and the expected wage is
c(1) c(1)
E[W (1)] = E [W (1)|S(1) = 1] +
c(1) + c(0) c(1) + c(0)
E [W (1)|S(1) = 0] .
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4. APPENDIX D: ESTIMATION
4.1. Likelihood function
Collecting the results of the previous section, we obtain a tractable expression for the
likelihood of the data under the minimum wage policy. Let Θ ≡ (θ, δ, π) be the entire
vector of model parameters, that is, those governing the latent distribution of wages,
the conditional probability of sector given wages and minimum wage effects. Define
the likelihood of observing a pair (w, s) given the minimum wage level m and model
parameters Θ as L(W (1) = w, S(1) = s|Θ) = Pr[S(1) = s|W (1) = w; Θ]f(w|Θ).
Three functional forms must be specified to obtain the exact expression for the like-
lihood function: A functional form for the unconditional distribution of latent wages,
one for the conditional probability of latent sector given the latent wage, and, lastly,
one functional form for the probability of non-compliance as a function of latent wage.
We use lognormality for the latent wage distribution, so f0(w) =
1 φ( log(w)−µ), where
wσ σ
φ is the density of the standard normal distribution. For the conditional probability
of latent sector given the latent wage, Pr[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w], we use a linear logit
δ +δ w
specification, so Pr[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w] ≡ Λ(w) = e 0 1
1+eδ +δ w0 1
. Finally, for the proba-
bility of non-compliance as a function of the wage, we use a constant specification, so
πs
(s)
d(w) = πd for all w and for s ∈ {0, 1}. 4
(1) ∫mπm∫ f0(w|θ)Λ(w|δ)dwLet ψ(Θ) ≡ m | . For the first term appearing in the log-likelihood, weπm(w)f0(w θ)dw
have:
log Pr[S(1) = s|W = w; Θ] = 1I{w = m} [1I{s = 1} logψ(Θ) + 1I{s = 0} log(1− ψ(Θ)]
(A.12) +1I{w > m} [1I{s = 1} log Λ(w|δ) + 1I{s = 0} log(1− Λ(w|δ))] .
4Our main results – namely that the minimum wage generates noticeable disemployment effects,
that the size of the formal sector is reduced, and that the likelihood of a formal worker moves to the
informal sector as an effect of the minimum wage policy is small, or around 10%– are unchanged when
different specifications of these functional forms are used. We tried flexible polynomials for the non-
compliance probability, higher-order terms for the logit specification, and more flexible functional
forms for the marginal distribution of latent wages. In particular, if anything, we find that the
probability of moving to the informal sector is even smaller (and the corresponding probability of
unemployment and bunching are larger) when different specifications are used. So we believe that
our main qualitative results are robust to the functional forms we used.
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For the second term in the log-likelihood, we have:
log f(w|Θ) = 1I{w < m} log(πd(w)f( 0(w|θ))∫ m )
+1I{w = m} log πm(u)f0(u|θ)du
(A.13) +1I{w > m} log f0(w|θ)− log c(Θ),
(1) (0) (1)
where πd(w) = Λ(w|δ)πd + (1 − Λ(w|δ))π | m −∫ d , and πm(w) = Λ(w δ)π + (1(0) m (1)
Λ(w|δ))πm , and c(Θ) ≡ 1− πu Λ(w)f0(w)dw . The parameter c(Θ) can be inter-
preted as the ratio of employment before and after the introduction of the minimum
wage.
Given that logL(W (1) = w, S(1) = s|Θ) = log Pr[S(1) = s|W (1) = w; Θ] +
log f(W (1) = w|Θ), we can define the maximum likelihood estimator of the model∑
parameters as Θ̂ = arg max 1 NΘ i logL(wi, si|Θ).N
4.2. Robustness: Alternative approaches to estimation
In this section, we discuss alternative approaches to estimate the model that can be
useful when one is interested in a greater degree of flexibility in the form that the
minimum wage affects certain parts of the wage distribution. Our goals are twofold:
To show (i) how one can allow the minimum wage to generate spillover effects higher
up on the wage distribution and still obtain consistent estimates of the effects of the
policy, and (ii) how one can allow for a much more flexible structure of minimum wage
effects in the bottom part of the wage distribution – that is, for workers whose latent
wages are below m–. To do that, we will essentially re-write write modified versions
of the likelihood function that are consistent with the flexibility we hope to obtain in
terms of the model. To start, we will use the following weak characterization of the
minimum wage effects, which nests the one we use in the main paper, but allows for
much more flexible patterns of effects in the bottom part of the wage distribution:
Remark 3 (Minimum wage effects’ structure (weak characterization))
Pr[W (1) > km|W (0) < km] = 0, for some known k ≥ 1.
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This assumption does not specify, and, by doing so, it leaves unrestricted the way
that the wages of formal sector workers will change when they move to the informal
sector, as long as they do not show up too far up in the right tail of the informal
sector wage distribution. Here we discuss how one can estimate the model parameters
under this weaker condition. It also allows the minimum wage to affect the wages of
workers that earn more than the minimum wage, within the range of wages between
m and km, where km is a tuning parameter, a user-specified upper bound for the
spillover effect.
The maximum likelihood estimator presented in Section 3 takes advantage of the fact
that the likelihood function is fully specified under the Dual-Economy extension of
Meyer and Wise’s model. However, this comes at the cost of restrictive assumptions
on how the minimum wage affects the bottom part and the upper part of the wage
distribution. That estimator, however, will in general be inconsistent to the true
value of the parameters of the model if the minimum wage generates effects higher
up on the wage distribution or if the form of minimum wage effects imposed by the
effect structure we impose in our main specification (Remarks 1 and 2 in the paper)
are incorrect. In this section, we investigate how one can attempt to estimate the
model parameters without relying on the complete absence of spillovers (Remark 1)
or fully specifying the effects of the minimum wage on the bottom part of the wage
distribution (Remark 2). To do that, we rely on the technical condition imposed by
Remark 3 above. We will also rely on limited spillovers, that is, we assume that the
spillover effects of the minimum wage at a known point km higher up on the wage
distribution. Under these assumptions, one can estimate the parameters of the latent
wage distribution by means of the following optimization:
N
θ̂
1 ∑
= arg max 1I{wi > km} log f(wi|wi > km; θ).
θ N
i
Then, estimate the conditional probability of the latent sector given the wages while
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also using values above km:
N
δ̂
1 ∑
= arg max 1I{wi > km} log Pr[si|wi; δ].
δ N
i
Under Assumption 5, the estimators defined by the equations above will be con-
sistent. This procedure yields consistent estimates because the density of wages for
values above the minimum is merely a function of a subset (θ) of the parameter
vector (Θ) and the fact that the true parameter θ0 is the argument that maximizes
E[log f(W (1)|W (1) > km; θ)]. The same holds for the conditional probability of sec-
tor given the wage: The conditional probability of observed sector given the wage, for
values above the minimum wage, is only a function of δ and the true parameter δ0 is
the argument that maximizes E[log(Pr[S(1)|W (1) > km; δ])].
Comparing the latent and observed wage and sector distributions, one can find the
effects of the minimum wage on outcomes such as average wages, size of the formal
sector, employment, and etc. These estimates obtained using this procedure are robust
to spillover effects as long as they are not present above km. These estimates also
bypass the need to specify exactly how the minimum wage affects the bottom part of
the wage distribution. In particular, we do not need to make any assumption about
how the wages of formal sector workers change once they move to the informal sector,
or whether the wages of low wage informal sector workers decrease due to the inflow
of low wage formal workers to that sector.
5. APPENDIX E: MARGINAL EFFECTS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE
Using the results in Appendix C, Section 3.3, we obtain the following equations that
describe the effects of the minimum wage on expected wages,
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( )
∂E [W (1)] 1 ∂c(1) ∂c(0)
(A.14) = Pr[W (1) = m]− + [W
∂m c + c(0)
E (1)]
(1) ∂m ∂m(
1 ∂c(1) ∂c(0)
)
+ + ξ m.
c(1) + c(0) ∂m ∂m
∂E [W (1)|S(1) = 1] 1 ∂c(1)
(A.15) = Pr [W (1) = m|S(1) = 1]− {E [W (1)|S(1) = 1]−m} .
∂m c(1) ∂m
∂E [W (1)|S(1) = 0] 1 ∂c(0)
(A.16) = Pr[W (1) = m|S(1) = 0]− {E [W (1)|S(1) = 0]− ξm} .
∂m c(0) ∂m
∂c 1− c
(A.17) ≈ − .
∂m m
∂c(1) 1− c(1)
(A.18) ≈ − .
∂m m
∂c(0) c(0) − 1
(A.19) ≈ .
∂m m
∂log(Pr[S(1) = 1]/Pr[S(1) = 0]) 1− c(1) 1 c(0) − 1 1
(A.20) = − − .
∂m c(1) m c(0) m
∫ m (1)
where c(1) = 1− (1−πm )f0(u|S(0) = 1)du. The effect of the minimum wage on the
average wages of the employed has three key components. The first is the “bite”, that
is, the proportion of workers who receive the minimum wage. This is the mechanical
effect of pushing up the wages of minimum wage workers. The second component
concerns unemployment effects: As long as the minimum wage is smaller than the
expectation of the observed wages, unemployment will increase the perceived effect
of the minimum wage on average wages for those who remain employed. This effect
is due to the removal of certain observations at the left tail of the distribution, which
contributes to increasing the average wage for those that remain employed. The third
effect is related to reallocation of labor across sectors: Some workers will migrate
from the formal to the informal sector, and, to the extent that this movement induces
changes in their wages, this will contribute to a change in the average.
The model predicts heterogeneous effects of the minimum wage across sectors. The
marginal effects of the minimum wage conditional on the sector are a function of
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the “bite” and the coefficients that govern the movements into or out of that sector
(1)
in response to the policy. The term multiplying dc in (A.15) measures the effect
dm
that workers moving out of formality have on expected wages in the sector. The term
multiplying dc
(0)
in (A.16) captures the effect that the entry of workers from the
dm
formal sector has on expected wages in the informal sector.5
In contrast to the formal sector, the minimum wage has an ambiguous impact on
average wages in the informal sector. The minimum wage policy induces an inflow
of low-wage workers from the formal sector to the informal sector. This mechanism,
depending on the size of the model parameters, can be sufficient to induce an overall
reduction of average wages in that sector. In terms of the size of each sector, as long
(1) (1)
as πd or πu is greater than zero, the minimum wage will reduce the total number
(1)
of workers employed in the formal sector, and as long as πd is greater than zero, the
opposite will be true for the informal sector.
6. APPENDIX F: ADDITIONAL EMPIRICAL RESULTS
6.1. Robustness
In this section, we discuss the results we obtain when we estimate the model relaxing
some of the assumptions of the model. First, we discuss the results we obtain when we
relax the structure imposed by Remark 2 of the paper. There, we specified the effects
of the minimum wage on the bottom part of the wage distribution. An important
restriction of this assumption is that the wages of workers in the informal sector
are not altered by the inflow of formal workers to that sector. Additionally, we also
impose that formal workers will earn a wage in the informal sector identical to ξ
times the wage that they would earn if they were employed in the formal sector.
Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, it is possible to estimate the model without imposing
these restrictions. To do that, we only need to impose the technical restriction implied
by Remark 3 stated above.
5Assumptions 3 and 4 exclude general equilibrium effects. The entry of workers into the formal
sector is assumed not to change the wages of workers in the informal sector.
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The baseline results we present in the main text assume that the minimum wage has no
effect on wages above m. This restriction is implied by the structure of the bargaining
model. However, this assumption would be violated in several different descriptions of
the environment. For example, absence of spillovers will not hold if the technology of
production displays complementarity or substitution between workers across different
levels of skill. Absence of spillovers will also not hold if workers are matched to
firms according to a matching technology that does not differentiate workers by skill
level (thus, a change in the number of low wage workers searching for jobs generate
congestion externalities for high wage workers, affecting their reservation wages). For
all these reasons, it is important to ask whether the results obtained in our preferred
specification are substantially changed when we allow for spillover effects.
Table I displays the estimates of the model parameters when we relax the effect struc-
ture in the bottom part of the wage distribution (Remark 2). In this specification,
the wages of formal workers are allowed to change in a quite flexible manner when
they move to the informal sector. Regarding Table I, the qualitative implications of
our empirical exercise remain roughly unaltered. The policy generates sizable un-
employment effects, the aggregate probability of non-compliance with the policy is
approximately 20%, and the latent size of the formal sector is approximately .78.
Table II displays the estimates of the model parameters when we relax the absence of
spillovers. In this specification, we allow the minimum wage to have effects on wages
up to R$40.00 above the minimum wage.6 The qualitative results we obtained when
we allow for spillover effects are similar to the ones in our preferred specification.
6.2. Additional Results
In this section, we report additional results based on our preferred specification and
comment on the ability of the model to fit the most important features of the joint
6This is roughly two times the average change in the real value minimum wage during the analyzed
period. That means, for example, that in the year 2001 we are allowing the minimum wage to have
an effect on wages roughly up to the real level of the minimum wage that prevails in the year 2003.
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Table I: Robustness - Unrestricted effects on the bottom part of the wage distribution
Parameter 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Aggregate
πd Non-compliance 0.19
∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
πm Bunching 0.26
∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
πu Non-employment 0.55
∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Pr[W (0) < m] Fraction Affected 0.26∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Pr[S(0) = 1] Latent size of the formal sector 0.76∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Formal Sector
π
(1)
d Sector mobility 0.03
∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
π
(1)
m Bunching 0.21∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
π
(1)
u Non-employment 0.76∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Informal Sector
π
(0)
d Non-compliance 0.61
∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
π
(0)
m Bunching 0.39∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors (computed using 100 replications) are given in parentheses.
Table II: Robustness to Spillovers
Parameter 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Aggregate
πd Non-compliance 0.18
∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
πm Bunching 0.24
∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
πu Non-employment 0.58
∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05)
Pr[W (0) < m] Fraction Affected 0.28∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Pr[S(0) = 1] Latent size of the formal sector 0.78∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Formal Sector
π
(1)
d Sector mobility 0.04
∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05)
π
(1)
m Bunching 0.19∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
π
(1)
u Non-employment 0.78∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07)
Informal Sector
π
(0)
d Non-compliance 0.62
∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗
(0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.10)
π
(0)
m Bunching 0.38∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.10)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors (computed using 100 replications) are given in parentheses.
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Table III: Parameter Estimates
Parameter 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Latent wage distribution:
µ 5.7432∗∗∗ 5.8388∗∗∗ 5.8713∗∗∗ 5.9415∗∗∗ 6.0661∗∗∗
(0.0095) (0.0098) (0.0089) (0.0081) (0.0120)
log(σ) -0.1344∗∗∗ -0.1459∗∗∗ -0.1493∗∗∗ -0.1724∗∗∗ -0.2038∗∗∗
(0.0071) (0.0076) (0.0067) (0.0055) (0.0077)
Conditional probability of sector given the wage:
δ0 0.9066
∗∗∗ 1.0692∗∗∗ 1.0441∗∗∗ 1.0554∗∗∗ 1.3348∗∗∗
(0.0265) (0.0229) (0.0356) (0.0360) (0.0382)
δ1 0.0006
∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors (computed using 100 replications) are given in parentheses.
distribution of sector and wage. First, we display the estimated parameters of the
latent wage distribution and the conditional probability of formality with respect
to the wage. These parameters are not of particular interest on their own but are
needed to obtain the marginal effects of the minimum wage and the estimates of the
probabilities π.
Figure 1 shows the estimates of the latent wage distributions for the formal and
informal sectors. We can see that the informal sector wage distribution tends to have
higher density for low wages relative to the formal sector. This follows from the
positive estimated slope coefficient on the relationship between latent sectors and
wage (δ1).
Figure 2 shows kernel density estimates of the wage distributions in the formal and
informal sectors for the year 2004. We observe substantial differences between the
observed wage distributions in the formal and informal sectors. The formal sector
wage distribution presents almost no density below the minimum wage level, whereas
the informal sector exhibits considerable mass in that range. Above the minimum
wage level, the formal sector density tends to be higher than the informal sector
density.
Table IV presents a comparison between certain moments of the data and those im-
plied by the model parameters. In examining this table, we can see that the model can
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Figure 1: Latent Densities
Note: Year 2004.
Figure 2: Observed Densities
Note: Density estimates using a gaussian kernel (bandwidth = R$30). Year 2004.
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Figure 3: Model Fit
Aggregate Formal Informal
Note: Density estimates based on a gaussian kernel (bandwidth = R$30). Year 2004.
Table IV: Model Fit
Parameter 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted
E[W ] 532.14 520.12 562.16 550.86 606.15 594.30 640.93 628.66 691.47 680.72
Sd[W ] 538.98 464.06 565.13 487.55 573.33 502.67 587.34 514.75 600.73 531.65
Skewness[W] 3.41 3.19 3.29 3.23 3.12 3.09 3.08 2.98 2.94 2.97
Kurtosis[W] 18.06 17.41 16.70 17.35 15.31 16.05 15.00 15.07 13.91 14.54
Pr[W = m] 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.14
Pr[W < m] 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08
q20[W ] 220.00 244.38 240.00 267.23 254.00 301.61 290.00 321.69 300.00 374.15
E[W |S = 1] 592.12 567.30 628.27 601.66 675.54 643.80 716.31 682.01 760.71 720.95
E[W |S = 0] 380.92 357.95 402.04 360.72 428.16 384.52 446.52 404.88 502.87 425.45
Sd[W |S = 1] 546.56 498.12 572.75 520.83 580.69 534.73 595.35 545.62 601.61 556.42
Sd[W |S = 0] 405.13 335.61 434.38 375.07 429.99 373.40 442.91 380.81 478.16 438.38
q20[W |S = 1] 260.00 264.06 280.00 297.83 300.00 341.77 350.00 361.85 380.00 414.51
q20[W |S = 0] 180.00 175.50 196.00 185.62 200.00 191.16 200.00 201.20 240.00 243.00
Pr[S = 1] 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.73 0.72
Pr[S = 1|W < m] 0.08 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.00
Pr[S = 1|W = m] 0.58 0.57 0.51 0.48 0.62 0.60 0.62 0.60 0.60 0.56
Pr[S = 1|W > m] 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.82 0.82
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Figure 4: Conditional Probability of Sector Given the Wage
Note: Observed conditional probabilities based on a non-parametric local constant
(Nadaraya-Watson) estimator using a gaussian kernel (bandwidth = R$30).Year 2004.
capture most of the features of the joint distribution of sector and wage. It predicts
the discontinuous shape of Pr[S(1) = 1|W (1)] observed in the data. It fits the prob-
abilities of observing wages at and below the minimum wage level and explains the
differences observed between the formal and informal sector distributions. Interest-
ingly, the model can match higher moments of the wage distribution, such as skewness
and kurtosis. This need not be the case in general, especially if the parametric family
for the wage distribution is severely misspecified.
Figure 4 shows the observed and predicted conditional probabilities of formality given
the wage. Figure 3 displays the predicted and observed densities of the aggregate wage
distribution and the formal and informal sector distributions. By examining these
figures, we again see that the model matches most of the prominent features of the
data, except the “heaping” observed at round numbers. It is nevertheless interesting
to note the resemblance between the predicted and observed curves in the empirical
cumulative distribution for the formal and informal sectors, particularly at and below
the minimum wage level.
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6.2.1. Decomposing the Differences in the Wage Distributions Across Sectors – The
Role of the Minimum Wage
Figure 5 displays the empirical CDF for the formal and informal sector for wages above
the minimum wage. These estimates are, by construction, invariant to the minimum
wage effects on the formal and informal sectors for values below the minimum wage.
Note that we observe a substantially smaller difference in the CDFs across sectors
in Figure 5 than in Figure 6 in the main article. This exercise suggests that the
differences across sectors observed in the upper part of the wage distribution across
sectors are also a consequence of the effects of the minimum wage in the bottom part
of the wage distribution.
The estimates of the model parameters allow us to understand the differences between
the wage distributions in the formal and informal sectors. Let D1 ≡ f(w|S(1) = 1)−
f(w|S(1) = 0). That is, D1 is defined as the observed difference in the density of wages
between the formal and informal sectors. Let Dm ≡ [f(w|S(1) = 1) − f0(w|S(0) =
1)] − [f(w|S(1) = 0) − f0(w|S(0) = 0)]. That is, Dm is defined as the difference
in the effects of the minimum wage between the formal and informal sectors. Define
D0 ≡ f0(w|S(0) = 1)−f0(w|S(0) = 0). That is, D0 is defined as the difference between
the latent wage densities between formal and informal sectors. From the definitions,
we have D1 = Dm + D0. Given the estimates of the model parameters, it is possible
to compute D1, Dm and D0. By comparing these estimates, we can infer the extent to
which the differences in the wage densities between the formal and informal sectors is
due to the minimum wage versus differences that would be present regardless of the
minimum wage policy. This decomposition can be performed at every point of the
wage distribution.
Figure 6 displays the differences in the density of wages between the formal and infor-
mal sectors. Given that the observed wage distribution in the formal sector stochasti-
cally dominates that in the informal sector, we observe a negative difference between
the formal and informal wage densities for low wages and positive for high wages.
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Figure 5: Empirical CDFs Above the Minimum Wage by Sector
We observe a similar pattern for the latent density as well. Figure 6 also displays the
differences between the effects of the minimum wage at each point of the wage distri-
bution. The estimates of the differences in the minimum wage effect tend to closely
follow the differences in the observed wage density across sectors. If we decompose
the differences in the observed wage distributions between the formal and informal
sectors in differences in latent wage distributions and differences in minimum wage
effects, my estimates suggest a larger role for the latter. For example, at the 5th
quantile of the wage distribution, the minimum wage policy accounts for 82% of the
differences in the wage density across sectors.
A decomposition of the difference in quantiles across sectors can be performed in
a similar way. The minimum wage accounts for 93% of the differences in the 10th
percentile of the wage distribution across sectors. Our estimates imply that 72% of the
differences in the median of the wage distribution between the formal and the informal
sectors is due to the minimum wage. At higher percentiles, such as the 90th percentile,
the minimum wage still accounts for 68% of the differences observed between the
formal and informal sectors. The minimum wage accounts for a substantial part of
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Figure 6: Decomposition of the Differences of the Densities Across Sectors
Formal minus Informal
Note: Density estimates based on a gaussian kernel (bandwidth = R$30). Year 2004.
the differences in the wage distribution across sectors for low and high wages, even
when wages above the minimum wage are, by assumption, not affected by the policy.
The reason for a substantial role of the minimum wage on explaining the differences in
the formal and informal sector wage densities above the minimum wage is the opposite
ways that the wage densities are rescaled across sectors due to the inflow/outflow of
workers as a result of the minimum wage policy.
